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Relinquishment of Prior Residence for State 
Income Tax Purposes: Wishing to Change 
Residence Does Not Make It So 
Prof. Jani E. Maurer* 
We live in an increasingly mobile and global society. Individuals 
move from one state to another for a variety of reasons. When the 
move is from a state which imposes income tax, particularly to a 
jurisdiction which does not, questions may arise about whether 
the individual remains a resident of the state from which he 
departed for income tax purposes.1 In the quest for revenue, 
certain states are aggressive in pursuing efforts to collect income 
tax from persons who claim to have changed their permanent 
residence.2 These states may assert that for income tax purposes 
the individual remains a resident of the state he left. This article 
examines the law applicable to a New York State resident who 
believes he established permanent residence elsewhere and may 
be unpleasantly surprised to find that he remains a New York State 
resident for income tax purposes. The distinction between 
residents and nonresidents of New York affects whether any 
income tax is owed to New York, and if taxes are due, whether 
taxes are to be computed on a resident’s entire income or a 
                                                                                                         
*  Professor of Law, Shepard Broad College of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Fort 
Lauderdale, Florida. J.D. New York Law School, 1998, cum laude. Professor Maurer is a 
member in good standing of the New York and Florida Bars. The author acknowledges the 
valuable input from Prof. Barbara Landau in respect to this article.  
1 This article addresses only state income tax and not state estate or inheritance tax to 
which a different test applies.  
2 In many states, statutes similar to those applicable in New York impose income tax 
on persons who have attempted to terminate their status as residents. See generally Timothy 
P. Noonan and Ariele R. Doolittle, Gaid v. New York: The State’s High Court Weighs in 
on Statutory Residence Rules, 24 JOURNAL OF MULTISTATE TAXATION AND INCENTIVES 2, 
8 (2014) (reflecting the extensive number of cases portraying permanent residents of New 
York State who were largely unsuccessful in asserting that their status changed, preventing 
them from becoming residents of Florida or another jurisdiction).  
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nonresident’s New York source income.3 While taxpayers with 
considerable income have the most at risk, states such as New 
York pursue taxpayers even when small sums are claimed due.4 
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I. APPLICABLE LAW 
“An individual may be a resident of New York State for personal 
income tax purposes, and taxable as a resident, even though such 
individual would not be deemed a resident for other purposes.”5 New York 
State income tax law sets forth two tests for determining if one is a resident 
for state income tax purposes.6 The first test is whether a person is 
domiciled in New York, i.e., one who maintains his primary place of 
permanent residence in New York.7 Domicile “is established by physical 
presence coupled with an intent to establish a permanent home.”8 A person 
                                                                                                         
3 See N.Y. Tax Law § 631 (McKinney 2017). A New York State resident is subject to 
income tax on all income. Id. In contrast, a nonresident of New York is subject to tax only 
on New York source income. N.Y. Tax Law § 611. If an individual is a nonresident of New 
York, disputes may arise about whether income was attributable to New York sources, see 
generally Clapes v. Tax App. Trib. of N.Y., 825 N.Y.S.2d 168 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 2006), 
or how much income was attributable to New York sources. Attea v. Tax App. Trib. of 
N.Y., 883 N.Y.S.2d 610 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 2009).  
4 See In re Santos, No. 820335, 2007 WL 507052 at *3 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. Feb. 1, 
2007) (asserting the deficiency as $2,432.05 plus interest and penalties).  
5 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 105.20(d)(2) (2009).  
6 See N.Y. Tax Law § 605(b) (McKinney 2015).  
7 Id. at § 605(b)(1)(A). For income tax purposes New York State defines domicile as 
“the place which an individual intends to be such individual’s permanent home – the place 
to which such individual intends to return whenever such individual may be absent.” tit. 
20, § 105.20(d). A person has only one domicile, although he may be a resident in multiple 
states. tit. 20, § 105.20(d)(4); see also In re Bauer, No. 818492, 2003 WL 78489 (N.Y. 
Div. Tax App Jan. 2, 2003).  
8 El–Tersli v. Comm’r of Taxation and Fin., 787 N.Y.S.2d 526, 527 (App. Div. 2005); 
Warnecke v. Tax App. Trib., 676 N.Y.S.2d 286, 287 (App. Div.1998); Gray v. Tax App. 
Trib., 651 N.Y.S.2d 740, 741 (App. Div. 1997); Kartiganer v. Koenig, 599 N.Y.S.2d 312, 
313 (App. Div. 1993).  
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may avoid inclusion in this defined group if one of two exceptions is 
satisfied. The first exception has three requirements, all of which must be 
met. This first exception requires that “the taxpayer maintains no 
permanent place of abode in [New York], maintains a permanent place of 
abode elsewhere, and spends in the aggregate not more than thirty days of 
the taxable year in [New York . . . .]”9 The second exception applies to 
persons who reside outside the United States for the requisite time and also 
has three parts, all of which must be met to avoid status as a domiciliary 
of New York State. Under this exception, to be domiciled somewhere 
other than New York the individual must satisfy the following: 
(I) within any period of five hundred forty–eight 
consecutive days the taxpayer is present in a foreign 
country or countries for at least four hundred fifty days, 
and (II) during the period of five hundred forty–eight 
consecutive days the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s spouse 
(unless the spouse is legally separated) and the taxpayer’s 
minor children are not present in [New York State] for 
more than ninety days, and (III) during the nonresident 
portion of the taxable year with or within which the period 
of five hundred forty–eight consecutive days begins and 
the nonresident portion of the taxable year with or within 
which the period ends, the taxpayer is present in [New 
York State] for a number of days which does not exceed 
an amount which bears the same ratio to ninety as the 
number of days contained in that portion of the taxable 
year bears to five hundred forty–eight . . . .10 
A married couple is generally treated as having the same domicile.11 
Spouses may have separate domiciles if they are legally separated, and 
only rarely if they are not.12 
Under the second test New York recognizes a person whose domicile 
is not New York as a “statutory resident” subject to income tax in New 
                                                                                                         
9 N.Y. Tax Law § 605(b)(1)(A)(i) (McKinney 2015).  
10 Id. at § 605(b)(1)(A)(ii).  
11 tit. 20, § 105.20(d)(5)(i); see e.g., In re Moed, No. 810997, 1993 WL 491193 (N.Y. 
Div. Tax App. Nov. 18, 1993). A wife was domiciled in New York whereas the taxpayer 
husband was domiciled in Connecticut. Id. Considerable testimony of both spouses and 
their adult son was introduced to explain the couple’s separate living arrangements. Id. A 
separate domicile may be established where spouses are “separated in fact.” Id.  
12 tit. 20, § 105.20(d)(5). Children are generally domiciled with their parents. Id. If the 
parents maintain separate domiciles, the child’s domicile is with the parent with whom the 
child lives for the majority of the year. Id. Other rules apply if a guardian was appointed 
for the child. Id.  
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York State as a resident.13 A statutory resident is one “who is not domiciled 
in [New York State] but maintains a permanent place of abode in [New 
York State] and spends in the aggregate more than one hundred eighty–
three days of the taxable year in [New York State], unless such individual 
is in active service in the armed forces of the United States.”14 
Nonresidents include only persons who are not considered residents 
under either one of the foregoing tests.15 A taxpayer who claims he was 
not a New York domiciliary or a statutory resident in a given year, contrary 
to the Tax Department’s conclusion, bears the burden of proof.16 A person 
who is either domiciled in New York State or who qualifies as a statutory 
resident of New York is subject to New York income tax as a resident. 
Even if a taxpayer is able to establish that she is not a statutory resident, if 
she was once domiciled in New York, unless she is also able to prove that 
she changed her domicile, she is subject to income tax as a resident.17 
Because the rules for determining domicile and resident or nonresident 
status reference days, the regulations specify how days are counted. Not 
surprisingly, the rules favor a decision that the taxpayer was in New York. 
As a general proposition, if a person is in New York for any part of a day, 
the day counts as one full day spent in New York.18 However, if a person 
merely travels through New York from one out of state location to another 
out of state destination, that presence within New York is not counted.19 
                                                                                                         
13 N.Y. Tax Law § 605(b)(1)(B) (McKinney 2015).  
14 Id. at § 605(b)(1)(B). An exception exists for individuals in the military. tit. 20, 
§ 105.20(d)(6). An individual in the military generally retains the domicile he had prior to 
joining the service, and the fact that he is stationed in New York and actually present there 
does not cause him to be domiciled in or a statutory resident of New York for income tax 
purposes. Id. For a person not in the military, the New York dwelling must be maintained 
for “substantially all of the year,” id. at § 105.20(a)(2), which is generally construed to be 
in excess of eleven months. See In re Mays, No. 826546, 2016 WL 6071985 at *5 (App. 
Div. Oct. 6, 2016).  
15 N.Y. Tax Law § 605(b)(2) (McKinney 2015); tit. 20, § 105.20(b).  
16 Clute v. Chu, 484 N.Y.S.2d 239, 242 (App. Div. 1984).  
17 See In re Taylor, No. 822824, 2010 WL 2801873 (N.Y. App. Div. July 8, 2010); In 
re Slotkis, No. 817952, 2002 WL 394249 (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 7, 2002). In these cases, 
although each taxpayer maintained a residence outside New York State and was present in 
New York for less than 183 days during the year, each remained subject to New York 
income tax as residents because they failed to prove a termination of New York domicile 
or establishment of domicile elsewhere. Taylor, 2010 WL 2801873; Slotkis, 2002 WL 
394249.  
18 tit. 20, § 105.20(c); Zanetti v. N.Y.S. Tax App. Trib., 8 N.Y.S.2d 733, 734–35 (App. 
Div. 2015). The court rejected the argument that a day should include an entire 24–hour 
period. Id. The taxpayer was able to establish that he spent 172 days outside New York and 
167 days in the state. Id. The dispute concerned 26 days in which he was only in New York 
for part of the day. Because those 26 days counted as presence in New York, the taxpayer 
exceeded the 183–day limit and was a statutory resident. Id.  
19 tit. 20, § 105.20(c) (This requires the taxpayer to retain adequate documentation to 
establish the details of her travel).
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Thus, a person traveling through New York from New Jersey to 
Massachusetts has not spent a day in New York.20 The same is true for a 
person who enters New York merely to board “a plane, ship, train or bus 
for travel to a destination outside New York.”21 
An element of both the test to determine if one is domiciled in New 
York and the test to determine if one is a statutory resident is maintaining 
a permanent place of abode in New York. That element is addressed in 
Part II of this Article. Part III of this Article explains when and how a 
person once domiciled in New York may or may not succeed in 
relinquishing that status. Part IV of this Article focuses on presence in New 
York and counting of days present in New York as pivotal in qualifying 
or not qualifying as a statutory resident for income tax purposes. Part V of 
this Article briefly addresses persons residing outside the U.S. Because 
New York may assert both domicile and statutory resident status as the 
basis for imposing income tax liability on a taxpayer and only needs to 
prevail on one ground,22 a review of both Parts II and III is warranted. 
The stated purpose of the statute is to address the legislature’s concern 
that persons who actually live in New York attempt to avoid income tax 
by falsely claiming to be residents elsewhere.23 A reader might consider 
whether the statute effectively accomplishes the stated legislative purpose. 
                                                                                                         
20 Id.  
21 Id.  
22 See generally, In re Lieberman, No. 824101, 2013 WL 3790595 *3 (N.Y. Div. Tax 
App. July 11, 2013); In re Santos, No. 820335, 2007 WL 507052 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. Feb. 
1, 2007); In re Knight, No. 819485, 2006 WL 3350785 (N.Y. Tax App. Trib. Nov. 9, 2006); 
In re Feldman, 1998 WL 168011 (N.Y. Tax App. Trib. Dec. 15, 1988). An example of a 
case whose facts exemplify cause for concern is In re Bourne’s Estate, 41 N.Y.S.2d 336 
(Surr. Ct. Westchester Co. 1943), involving whether decedent was a resident of New York 
or Florida at death for purposes of imposition of estate tax. After being domiciled in New 
York for many years, Mr. Bourne expressed his desire to become a Florida resident. 
Toward that end he consulted Florida counsel. Mr. Bourne signed a Florida will, registered 
to vote in Florida and filed Florida intangible tax returns. He moved his yacht from New 
York to Florida and lived in it. Documents reflected that he purchased a residence. 
However, he never occupied the residence and he sold it the following year. He then rented 
a portion of his attorney’s home, but didn’t live there either. Mr. Bourne’s representations 
about his domicile were inconsistent. The majority of his vast wealth remained at all times 
in New York. He did not sell or rent his New York home. Instead, he continued to occupy 
it, left his personal belongings there, continued to have staff work there, and he used the 
New York address to register autos, sell real estate and engage in other financial 
transactions. The result was a ruling that decedent had not changed his domicile. 
23 Gaied v. N.Y.S. Tax App. Trib., 983 N.Y.S.2d 757, 760 (N.Y. 2014); Tamagni v. Tax 
App. Trib., 695 N.E.2d 1125 (N.Y. 1998); Zanetti, 8 N.Y.S.3d at 734.  
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II. MAINTAINING A PERMANENT PLACE OF ABODE 
A taxpayer seeking to avoid having a domicile in New York must 
establish that he does not maintain his primary permanent place of abode 
in New York State and he does maintain one elsewhere. To avoid statutory 
resident status a taxpayer will attempt to establish either that he does not 
maintain a permanent place of abode in New York State, or if he does he 
is not in the State for more than 183 days. Thus, maintaining a permanent 
place of abode in New York is relevant to both tests. A permanent place 
of abode is a dwelling owned, leased or legally used by a taxpayer or the 
taxpayer’s spouse.24 Maintaining a home refers to “doing whatever is 
necessary to continue one’s living arrangements in a particular dwelling 
place”, and includes making payments to support the home.25 There are 
two aspects to the permanent requirement. One, found in the statute, 
                                                                                                         
24 tit. 20, § 105.20(e)(1). Where a taxpayer was a Merchant Marine who maintained a 
residence in New York occupied by his spouse and child, the residence qualified as an 
abode. Oatman v. State Tax Comm., 377 N.Y.S.2d 659 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 1975); see also 
In re Mays, No. 826546, 2016 WL 6071985 at *5 (App. Div. Oct. 6, 2016). In Mays, the 
taxpayer accepted employment in New York. She resided during the tax year in dispute in 
two locations in New York City. Id. The first was a fully furnished apartment provided by 
her employer, sans lease, which the taxpayer contended was only for her exclusive use until 
she located more permanent housing. Id. The taxpayer failed to offer evidence, other than 
her testimony, that occupancy of this first apartment was intended to be temporary. Id. The 
second residence was a New York City apartment leased by the taxpayer’s fiancé. Id. 
Although the taxpayer signed no lease for either apartment, because she had exclusive use 
and access both apartments constituted residences maintained by the taxpayer as her abode. 
Id.  
25 El–Tersli v. Comm’r of Taxation and Fin., 787 N.Y.S.2d 526, 528 (App. Div. 2005). 
(relying on Evans v. Tax App. Trib., 606 N.Y.S. 404 (App. Div. 1993), which addressed 
whether an individual was a New York City resident liable for city income tax.) In Evans 
the taxpayer admittedly lived in upstate New York in a home he owned, and was employed 
in New York City. Evans, 606 N.Y.S. 404. To avoid a long daily commute to work, during 
the work week Mr. Evans lived with his friend, a priest, at a church rectory in New York 
City. Id. The taxpayer had no lease and paid no rent. Id. He contributed to common living 
expenses, such as the costs of food, cleaning supplies and a housekeeper, while he stayed 
at the rectory. Id. The taxpayer left his furniture, clothing and other personal items in the 
rectory, had a key to facilitate unrestricted access, and had visitors while he stayed at the 
rectory for seven years. Id. New York City, like the state, imposed income tax on a person 
who maintained a permanent place of abode in the city and was present there for over 183 
days during the calendar year. Id. at 405. The taxpayer argued unsuccessfully that his stay 
at the rectory did not constitute maintaining a permanent abode. Id. The fact that the 
taxpayer did not own, lease or rent the rectory did not prevent him from having a permanent 
residence there. Id. The limited acts of leaving personal objects at the premises, 
contributing to costs of upkeep and occupying the residence regularly constituted 
maintaining an abode. Id.  
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addresses the nature of the structure used as a home.26 The second, found 
in the regulations, requires that the dwelling be permanently maintained.27 
What constitutes maintaining a permanent place of abode under the 
regulations is not always clear. Historically, the position of the New York 
State Department of Taxation and Finance, regularly sustained by the 
Administrative Law Judges and the courts, was that a permanent place of 
abode existed if the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s spouse owned or rented a 
dwelling.28 This conclusion might be reached even if the taxpayer claimed 
he did not occupy the home, absent evidence that persons other than the 
taxpayer or the taxpayer’s spouse lived there.29 Where a taxpayer asserted 
that his father and brother occupied a rental apartment formerly occupied 
by the taxpayer, the absence of proof of that fact lead to the conclusion 
that the taxpayer still maintained the apartment as his permanent abode.30 
Where a taxpayer continued to own and occasionally occupy his New 
York home, he maintained the abode although his adult daughter lived 
there.31 
The fact that the taxpayer is a record title owner of a home does not 
automatically mean he maintains a permanent abode, where the taxpayer 
is able to establish that he did not occupy or have the right to occupy the 
home and he did not purchase the home, even though he contributed to the 
costs of maintaining the home.32 A residence owned or leased by a 
taxpayer must be maintained by him for his own use and occupancy to 
qualify as a permanent place of abode. 
When a taxpayer maintains a home in New York for the use of 
someone other than himself, his spouse or his dependent children, the 
                                                                                                         
26 N.Y. Tax Law § 605 (McKinney 2015).  
27 tit. 20, § 105.20(e)(1); Knight, 2006 WL 3350785 at *27.  
28 tit. 20, § 105.20(e)(1).  
29 See El–Tersli, 787 N.Y.S.2d 526. The taxpayer who claims other persons resided in 
an apartment he rented and allegedly vacated has to prove that fact. Id.  
30 Id.  
31 In re Feldman, No. 802955, 1988 WL 168011 (N.Y. Tax App. Trib. Dec. 15, 1988). 
The taxpayers owned a two family home in New York City. Id. They initially lived in the 
second floor unit while the husband conducted his medical practice in the first floor unit. 
Id. The husband cut back on his medical practice. Id. The taxpayers first leased and then 
purchased a Florida residence, where they spent winters. Id. Summers were spent in their 
summer home in upstate New York. Id. The first floor unit was remodeled to enable 
taxpayers to remain there during their minimal visits to New York. Id. Their daughter 
continued to occupy the second floor unit. Id. These facts justified the conclusion that the 
taxpayers maintained an abode in New York. Id. at *4. 
32 Chancey v. State Tax Comm., 415 N.Y.S.2d 491 (App. Div. 1979). The taxpayer’s 
mother purchased, paid for and occupied a home in New York. Id. For estate planning 
purposes she titled the home in her name jointly with her son (the taxpayer) with rights of 
survivorship. Id. The taxpayer did not occupy the home but provided financial support to 
his mother. Hence, he directly or indirectly paid some home related expenses. Id. Based on 
these facts the home was not a permanent abode of the taxpayer. Id.  
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home may not be the permanent place of abode of the taxpayer for income 
tax purposes.33 The purpose of the statutory resident statute was to prevent 
abuse and income tax avoidance by persons who really were New York 
residents based on their activities, time spent in New York and access to a 
home.34 “[F]or an individual to qualify as a statutory resident, there must 
be some basis to conclude that the dwelling was utilized as the taxpayer’s 
residence.”35 A residential property in New York owned by a taxpayer but 
not habitable due to ongoing construction or renovation may fail to qualify 
as an abode for this purpose.36 
It may not be necessary for the taxpayer to own or rent the New York 
residence or to contribute financially to its maintenance for the taxpayer 
to be domiciled in New York, where he has the unrestricted right to occupy 
                                                                                                         
33 Gaied v. N.Y.S. Tax App. Trib., 983 N.Y.S.2d 757 (N.Y. 2014). The taxpayer was 
initially domiciled in New Jersey, owned a business in New York, and commuted to work. 
Id. at 758. He purchased a multifamily apartment building in New York near his business, 
as both an investment and to provide a home for his parents. Id. Taxpayer’s parents 
occupied one apartment in the building and the other units were rented to tenants. Id. As 
the taxpayer supported his parents, the utilities (gas, electric and telephone) for service to 
his parents’ apartment were in his name and the taxpayer paid those bills. Id. The taxpayer 
stayed at the apartment only on rare occasions when a parent needed his help. Id. When he 
did so the taxpayer slept on the couch. Id. The taxpayer did not leave his personal 
belongings in the apartment. Id. There was evidence adverse to the taxpayer’s position that 
he was not a statutory resident of New York because the apartment was not his permanent 
place of abode. During one year in dispute the voter registration records reflected that the 
taxpayer voted in New York. At the end of the last tax year in dispute the taxpayer sold his 
New Jersey home, placed his belongings in storage and lived with a relative in New Jersey. 
At that time the taxpayer was renovating a room in the New York apartment building he 
expected to occupy in the future.  
34 Id. The court stated that there was no rational basis to support the Tax Department’s 
interpretation of the statute that a taxpayer who maintains a residence but does not reside 
in it is a statutory resident of New York. Id. at 760.  
35 Id.  
36 See In re Stewart, No. 816263, 2000 WL 49084 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. Jan. 13, 2000). 
Ms. Stewart asserted that during the 1991 and 1992 tax years in dispute she did not maintain 
an abode in New York, because her East Hampton home was being renovated and was not 
habitable. Id. at * 6. Her contention was upheld for 1991, but not for 1992. Id. Ms. Stewart 
offered documentation indicating that renovation construction ended in 1991, although she 
thereafter claimed it continued during 1992. Id. The Tax Department questionnaire signed 
by Ms. Stewart reflected that she occupied the residence during the summer of 1991. Id. 
Books and magazines published reflected that Ms. Stewart occupied the New York home 
in 1991. Id. Construction work on the home was supposedly completed simultaneously 
with renovation of a cottage on the property, and there was evidence that Ms. Stewart’s 
daughter occupied the cottage in 1991. Id. Having cable T.V. service installed in the 
property with access to extra channels supported habitability. Id. The conflicting evidence 
led to the conclusion that the taxpayer maintained a New York abode in 1991. Id. In the 
same case the taxpayer owned a second residence, an apartment in New York City. Id. at 
* 3. Because that apartment was under constructions and uninhabitable during the tax years 
in dispute, it did not constitute the taxpayer’s abode.  
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it.37 Where a taxpayer lived in a home rented by his parents in New York, 
then moved to California and later returned to his parents’ rental 
apartment, because he did not establish domicile in California he was 
deemed to remain domiciled in New York.38 
The requirement of permanently maintaining an abode is not met if 
the residence “is maintained only during a temporary stay for the 
accomplishment of a particular purpose.”39 To illustrate, the 
nondomiciliary of New York who rents an apartment within New York for 
a month to conduct specific business is not likely permanently maintaining 
an abode. In contrast, a taxpayer who occupies one New York residence 
temporarily while searching for suitable long term lodging in New York 
is permanently maintaining an abode in the temporary living quarters.40 
“[T]he permanence of a dwelling place for purposes of the personal 
income tax can depend on a variety of factors and cannot be limited to 
circumstances which establish a property right in the dwelling place.”41 
An apartment may constitute the taxpayer’s permanent abode although she 
is not named as a tenant on the lease, particularly where she has exclusive 
use of the apartment. 
If an individual owns residential real property in New York occupied 
by a person (other than the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s spouse or the 
taxpayer’s minor child), the taxpayer does not occupy the home and the 
taxpayer permanently resides elsewhere, the residence is not the 
taxpayer’s permanent place of abode. It is still unclear whether New York 
residential property which the taxpayer owns or leases and which he could 
occupy qualifies as his permanent place of abode if he does not actually 
occupy the residence. If the taxpayer maintains the home and has the right 
to occupy it, precedent may still support the conclusion that it qualifies as 
the taxpayer’s permanent abode. If a person other than the taxpayer 
regularly occupies the residence as his home, it is not known how often 
the taxpayer who permanently resides elsewhere may stay in the home 
before it qualifies as the taxpayer’s permanent place of abode. 
                                                                                                         
37 See In re Santos, No. 820335, 2007 WL 507052 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. Feb. 1, 2007); 
see also In re Mays, No. 826546, 2016 WL 6071985 at *5 (App. Div. Oct. 6, 2016) (finding 
that a dwelling was used by the taxpayer as her residence although she did not execute a 
lease or own it).  
38 In re Santos, 2007 WL 207052 at *6. The opinion reflects the conclusion that the 
taxpayer always lived in New York prior to his move to California. Id. Thus, he was 
domiciled in New York. Id. The opinion does not mention the requirement that the taxpayer 
maintain an abode. Id.
39 Mays, 2016 WL 6071985 at *4.  
40 Id. Because the legislature did not define “maintain” in the statute, the court concluded 
that “one maintains a place of abode by doing whatever is necessary to continue one’s 
living arrangements in a particular dwelling place.” Id.  
41 Id.  
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“‘[A] permanent place of abode’ is one maintained by a taxpayer for 
‘substantially all of the taxable year.’”42 For a property to qualify as a 
permanent place of abode, the taxpayer must have the right to occupy it.43 
Where a taxpayer and his family vacate a New York apartment, relocate 
all personal property to a new home, but continue to own, renovate and 
pay utility bills on the New York home in preparation for its sale, the 
apartment no longer qualifies as a permanent abode of the taxpayer when 
the listing agreement precludes him from occupying it.44 
A taxpayer’s actual occupancy of a New York residential property, 
even on a regular basis, does not alone automatically cause it to be a 
permanent place of abode of the taxpayer. This is particularly true where 
the taxpayer does not own or rent the premises and has no legal right to 
occupy it at all times. The fact that a taxpayer stays overnight at his 
girlfriend’s New York apartment when she permits him to do so does not 
result in a conclusion that he maintains that apartment as his abode, when 
he does not contribute to the apartment expenses, does not leave his 
personal belongings there, and does not have unrestricted access.45 
Likewise, an apartment rented by a limited liability company and occupied 
periodically by the taxpayer was not maintained by him as a permanent 
residence, when an LLC in which the taxpayer was a member paid the rent 
and utilities, the taxpayer’s furniture and personal belongings were not left 
in the apartment, and the taxpayer did not have unrestricted access to all 
or a portion of the apartment.46 
A taxpayer’s irrevocable transfer of ownership of his New York home 
to another does not prevent the home from being the taxpayer’s place of 
abode when he continues to occupy it as a tenant.47 The transfer of 
                                                                                                         
42 N.Y. Commissioner of Taxation and Finance Advisory Opinion TSB–A–11(9) 1, 
Petition No. 1110727A, 2011 WL 7113871 (N.Y. Dept. Tax. Fin. Nov. 8, 2011) (citing tit. 
20, § 105.20(a)(2)).  
43 Id.  
44 Id. The apartment was furnished with new or borrowed furnishings after the 
taxpayer’s family vacated it. Id. The taxpayer avoided status as a statutory resident, despite 
his presence in New York for over 183 days, because he did not maintain the apartment for 
his own use. Id.  
45 In re Knight, 2006 WL 3350785 at *27–28 (N.Y. Tax App. Trib. Nov. 9, 2006).  
46 Id. at *28–29. The taxpayer indirectly contributed to the cost of maintaining the 
apartment, as his share of LLC profits was diminished by the costs. Id. The conclusion was 
reached despite the facts that the taxpayer guaranteed the lease, signed some rent checks 
written by the LLC, and furnished the apartment with items paid for by the LLC. Id. The 
taxpayer occupied the apartment infrequently, and it was used by other LLC members and 
LLC clients. Id.  
47 In re Lieberman, No. 824101, 2013 WL 3790595 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. July 11, 2013). 
In Lieberman, the taxpayers irrevocably transferred ownership of their New York home to 
a qualified personal residence trust with a ten–year duration. Id. During and after the ten 
years the taxpayers continued to occupy the home. Id. After the trust ended, the home was 
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ownership to a qualified personal residence trust or to the taxpayers’ 
children does not alone affect the status of the home as taxpayer’s abode.48 
 The statute expressly refers to a “permanent” place of abode.49 A 
relevant question is whether any dwelling the taxpayer maintained was 
permanent within the meaning of the statute. The permanent requirement 
refers in part to the structure of the home. Not all structures qualify as 
permanent abodes. “[A] mere camper or cottage, which is suitable and 
used only for vacations, is not a permanent place of abode.”50 Also 
excluded from the definition of permanent place of abode is any structure 
lacking cooking, bathing or other facilities normally found in a home, and 
housing occupied by a full time college student.51 
Where taxpayers were not New York domiciliaries and owned a 
dwelling in upstate New York, the dwelling qualified as a cottage suitable 
for and used only for vacation purposes.52 The dwelling was accessible 
only by travel over a dirt trail, the trail was not well maintained, and the 
trail was located in an easement shared by nearby homeowners. The 
structure consisted of two bedrooms in a 1,000 square foot framed building 
with a cement foundation over a crawl space. The only heat was provided 
by electric baseboard units, but hot water and indoor plumbing were 
available. The home was not readily accessible during winter months, and 
neither the taxpayers nor owners of adjacent properties used the units 
during the winter.53 The government’s argument that to qualify as a cottage 
the unit must lack both a furnace and running water was rejected.54 
Because the property was only suitable for brief vacations seasonally and 
                                                                                                         
owned by the taxpayers’ children, from whom the taxpayers rented the home. Id. During 
the rental period the taxpayers continued to pay all costs associated with occupancy of the 
home and it remained their permanent abode, despite their purchase of a residence in 
Florida. Id.  
48 See id.  
49 N.Y. Tax Law § 605(b)(1)(B) (McKinney 2015).  
50 tit. 20, § 105.20(e)(1).  
51 Id. A full time student is defined as one taking at least 12 credit hours per semester 
for at least two semesters during the tax year. Id.  
52 In re Slavin, No. 820744, 2007 WL 1741119, at *5 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. June 7, 2007).  
53 Id. at *3. The tribunal noted the considerable disparity between the value of the New 
York residence in a summer resort area of about $40,000.00 compared to the considerably 
greater value ($480,000.00 in 1998 and $2,300,000.00 in 2002) of the taxpayer’s primary 
residence in New Jersey. Id. While the taxpayer – husband was employed in New York, he 
worked nowhere near the vacation home and did not commute to work from the vacation 
home. Id.  
54 Id. at *4. The tribunal recognized that the regulation sets forth essentially two separate 
tests. One was that “a mere camp or cottage, suitable and used only for vacations, is not a 
permanent place of abode.” tit. 20, § 105.20(e)(1). The other was that “a barracks or any 
construction which does not contain facilities ordinarily found in a dwelling . . . will 
generally not be deemed a permanent place of abode.” Id.  
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was only used that way by the taxpayers, it did not qualify as a permanent 
place of abode.55 
Similarly, a summer home in upstate New York used only from May 
to September annually, located on a dirt road not maintained year round, 
which did not have water other than during the summer, was not a 
permanent structure within the meaning of the statute.56 The home had no 
basement, was not insulated or fully heated, and the taxpayers turned off 
utility service after each summer.57 Because the home was only suitable 
for occupancy during the summer it was not a permanent residence.58 
The standard for determining whether a structure is permanent is 
objective.59 If the structure has adequate facilities and services appurtenant 
to it to permit its use on a year round basis, the fact that the taxpayer found 
it suitable only for vacations or actually used it infrequently does not 
prevent it from qualifying as a permanent abode.60 When the taxpayer has 
the legal right to use and occupy the premises, the fact that occupancy by 
other family members permitted by the taxpayer deterred him from using 
the premises likewise does not prevent it from qualifying as a permanent 
abode of the taxpayer.61 That the residence is described as a “seasonal 
dwelling” on an insurance policy does not prevent it from being 
permanent, particularly when there is utility service all year.62 Similarly, 
where a taxpayer domiciled in Florida rents a New York apartment, has 
the right to use it at all times and only occupies it occasionally, the 
taxpayer maintained a permanent abode in New York despite her view that 
it was a vacation home.63 
                                                                                                         
55 Slavin, 2007 WL 1741119 at *5.  
56 In re Feldman, No. 802955, 1998 WL 168011 at *3 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. Dec. 15, 
1988).  
57 Id.  
58 Id. In Feldman, the taxpayers owned another home in New York City, which was a 
permanent residence. Id.  
59 In re Barker, No. 822324, 2011 WL 198441, at *8 (N.Y. Tax App. Jan. 13, 2011).  
60 Id. at *8. The taxpayers were domiciled in Connecticut, although the husband worked 
in New York and was present in New York for in excess of 183 days each year. Id. The 
taxpayers purchased a vacation home in Long Island, New York. Id. During the tax years 
in question, the taxpayers stayed at the vacation home for between 16 and 19 days a year. 
Id. The vacation home was small and equipped with utilities for year round living. Id. 
However, the taxpayers did not find it suitable for year round living, nor did they ever 
intend to occupy it other than as a vacation home. Id. The taxpayers’ subjective view was 
not relevant to whether the structure was a permanent abode. Id.  
61 Id. at *5. The taxpayers allowed the wife’s parents to use the vacation home. Id. The 
parents did so to the extent that the taxpayers were deterred from occupying the property. 
Id. Because this was the taxpayers’ choice and the taxpayers had the legal right to occupy 
the home, these facts did not alter the outcome. Id.  
62 Id.  
63 Stranahan v. N.Y.S. Tax Comm’r., 416 N.Y.S.2d 836, 838 (App. Div. 1979).  
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The court determinations referenced above holding that ownership of 
an infrequently used New York vacation home by a person domiciled in 
another state constituted maintenance of a permanent residence in New 
York were issued before the court’s decision in Gaied. It is difficult to 
comprehend how causing a taxpayer admittedly living outside New York 
to be a statutory resident based on ownership and minimal use of a 
vacation home in New York, even if the home was equipped for year–
round use, furthers the legislative purpose of the statute to prevent abuse.64 
In contrast to vacation homes, when a taxpayer remains in a nursing 
home in New York to receive medical care, the taxpayer is not maintaining 
an abode in New York.65 
Whether a residence is permanent also focuses on the taxpayer’s 
connection to the home. The amount of time the taxpayer occupies the 
dwelling is relevant to a determination of whether it qualifies as a 
permanent place of abode. But that fact alone is not determinative where 
the taxpayer has the right to occupy on a regular basis.66 Courts consider 
how frequently and regularly the taxpayer occupies the residence in 
ascertaining if the permanent requirement is satisfied.67 
III. TERMINATING NEW YORK DOMICILE 
The concept of domicile is relevant to whether one is subject to New 
York State income tax either as a domiciliary of New York or as a statutory 
resident. To avoid inclusion in either group, the taxpayer must 
affirmatively establish that his domicile changed from New York to 
another location or he was never domiciled in New York. A taxpayer 
residing in New York who asserts he was never domiciled there has the 
burden to prove his move to New York was temporary.68 
                                                                                                         
64 See Barker, 2011 WL 198441 at *2.  
65 Comm’r of Taxation and Fin. Advisory Op., TSB–A–91 (10)1, 1991 WL 323200, at 
*1 (N.Y. Dept. Tax. Fin. Dec. 24, 1991); see Comm’r of Taxation and Fin. Advisory Op., 
TSB–A–00(3)1, 2000 WL 900532, at *2 (N.Y. Dept. Tax. Fin. May 31, 2000).  
66 In re Moed, No. 810997, 1993 WL 491193, at *8 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. Nov. 18, 1993).  
67 Id. Where a taxpayer was living separately from his wife, their marital relationship 
continued, and the taxpayer generally spent one weeknight in his wife’s New York 
apartment each week, the apartment qualified as his permanent (although not primary) 
residence. Id. The facts that the taxpayer only stayed at the apartment if his wife was there, 
after notice to his wife, and only left minimal personal belongings at the apartment did not 
alter the outcome. Id. Nothing prevented the taxpayer from occupying the New York 
apartment more frequently. Id.  
68 See Bernbach v. State Tax Comm., 471 N.Y.S.2d 903, 904 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 1984). 
Taxpayer moved from a rental apartment in New Jersey to a cooperative apartment he 
purchased in New York, allegedly for his wife to receive psychiatric care. Id. Because the 
taxpayer failed to establish that the move was temporary, the court upheld the 
Commission’s determination that the taxpayers became domiciled in New York. Id.  
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If a person who maintains his primary home in New York and is thus 
domiciled there moves out of state with no intent to return to New York, 
that person is no longer domiciled in New York.69 To change domicile the 
taxpayer need not intend to live in the new locale forever; it is sufficient if 
he intends to stay indefinitely and has no plans to return to New York.70 
But a taxpayer who accepts temporary employment of short term duration 
outside New York does not change his domicile merely by residing in the 
new state.71 A taxpayer who has a “floating intention to return to his former 
domicile at some future and indefinite time” may still have changed his 
domicile.72 The taxpayer who claims to have changed her domicile to a 
state other than New York has the burden of proving that.73 “Moves to 
other states in which permanent residences are established do not 
necessarily provide clear and convincing evidence of an intent to change 
one’s domicile.”74 
“To establish a change, the [taxpayer] bears the burden of proving, by 
clear and convincing evidence, that he or she obtained a new residence, 
                                                                                                         
69 tit. 20, § 105.20(d)(2). No change of domicile results from a removal to a new location 
if the intention is to remain there for only a limited time; this rule applies even though the 
individual may have sold or disposed of such individual’s former home. Id.  
70 In re Gemmel, No. 819222, 2004 WL 2634346 at *11 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. Nov. 10, 
2004); see also McKone v. State Tax Comm., 490 N.Y.S. 2d 628 (App. Div. 1985). In 
McKone, the court ruled that taxpayers who moved from New York to Canada due to the 
husband’s job change, sold their New York home, acquired a home in Canada, moved all 
accounts and possessions to Canada and obtained permanent resident visas in Canada were 
no longer domiciled in New York. McKone, 490 N.Y.S. 2d at 630.  
71 In re Santos, No. 820335, 2007 WL 507052, at*6 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. Feb. 1, 2007). 
The taxpayer accepted employment in California pursuant to a six–month employment 
contract. Id. During his first two months in California he resided in hotels. Id. Thereafter, 
he rented an apartment on a month–to–month basis, where he remained for about four 
months. Id. During his six months in California the taxpayer visited New York twice. Id. 
Although he initially went to California hoping to remain there permanently, after six 
months his plans changed and he returned to New York. Id. The temporary nature of his 
work in California, clearly delineated as temporary in his employment contract, supported 
the conclusion that the taxpayer lacked intent to change his domicile. Id. See also In re 
Simon, No. 801309, 1989 WL 127186, at *4 (N.Y. Tax App. Trib. Mar. 2, 1989), where 
the taxpayer left his family in Buffalo, New York, his historic home, to live first in Florida 
and then in Pennsylvania for teaching positions. Id. The taxpayer rented residences in each 
state to which he moved, and borrowed furniture to use in the residence. Id. Although the 
taxpayer obtained a Florida driver’s license, scant evidence reflected his intent to 
permanently relocate. Id. Instead, the taxpayer repeatedly returned to his family in Buffalo, 
leading to the conclusion that his domicile never changed. Id.  
72 Gemmel, 2004 WL 2634346 at *11.  
73 tit. 20, § 105.20(d)(2); see also El–Tersli v. Comm’r of Taxation and Fin., 787 
N.Y.S.2d 526, 527–28 (App. Div. 2005); Gray v. Tax App. Trib., 651 N.Y.S.2d 740, 741 
(App. Div. 1997).  
74 In re Wechsler, No. 806431, 1991 WL 95626, at *6 (N.Y. Tax App. Trib. May 16, 
1991).  
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actually resided there and intended to make the new location a fixed and 
permanent home.”75 That burden of proof is difficult to meet. The standard 
enunciated for determining if a change of domicile occurred is subjective, 
as it focuses on the individual taxpayer’s actual intent.76 But courts base 
their decisions on a review of objective factors used to ascertain if the 
taxpayer sufficiently manifested his intent by his actions.77 It is not 
necessary for a taxpayer to sever all ties to New York to establish a change 
in domicile.78 The taxpayer who after the move maintains no home in New 
York for his own use has the strongest case that he relinquished his New 
York domicile. However, selling a former residence does not guaranty that 
the taxpayer changed his domicile. If a taxpayer intends to remain at a new 
location for only a limited time, although he sold his former New York 
home he may remain domiciled in New York.79 A taxpayer who leaves 
New York expecting the move to another jurisdiction to be permanent, 
accepts employment in the new locale, maintains no home in New York 
and severs all ties with New York is generally no longer domiciled in New 
York, despite the fact that changed circumstances thereafter caused him to 
return to New York years later.80 
                                                                                                         
75 Kornblum v. Tax App. Trib., 599 N.Y.S.2d 158, 159 (App. Div. 1993).  
76 In re Patrick, Nos. 826838 and 826839, 2017 WL 2801958, at *12 (N.Y. Div. Tax 
App. June 15, 2017); In re Slotkis, No. 817952, 2002 WL 394249 at *4 (N.Y. Div. Tax 
App. Mar. 7, 2002).  
77 Slotkis, 2002 WL 394249 at *4; see also Patrick, 2017 WL 2801958 at *12.  
78 In re Gemmel, No. 819222, 2004 WL 2634346, at *14 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. Nov. 10, 
2004); see also Patrick, 2017 WL 2801958 at *13; In re Alfano, No. 817356, 2001 WL 
408759, at * 8 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. Apr. 12, 2001); In re Burke, No. 810631, 1194 WL 
266764, at *12 (N.Y. Tax App. Trib. June 2, 1994).  
79 tit. 20, § 105.20(d)(2).  
80 Chancey v. State Tax Comm’n, 415 N.Y.S. 491, 492 (App. Div. 1979). The taxpayers, 
a married couple, lived in New York and were domiciled there until February 1965, when 
they moved to Chicago, Illinois. Id. The husband accepted employment in Chicago with a 
union and expected to remain in Chicago long term. His predecessor held the union position 
for twenty years. Id. The taxpayers rented an apartment in Chicago, moved all of their 
personal belongings with them, transferred bank accounts to Chicago, “registered to vote 
and voted from Chicago, joined a church and other clubs, changed their passports to reflect 
Illinois as their place of residence, took a ‘phone listing, filed federal tax returns listing 
Chicago as their residence, bought a car which they registered in conformity with Illinois 
law, took out insurance and maintained an account with a mutual fund operation in 
Chicago,’” Id. at 492. The taxpayers’ only remaining connections to New York after the 
move to Illinois were related to the husband’s mother. Id. The mother lived in New York 
and titled her home and her bank account in joint names with her son for estate planning 
purposes. Id. The taxpayer supported his mother and his federal income tax return reflected 
that fact. Id. When the taxpayer’s employer in Chicago went out of business, the taxpayers 
returned to New York and lived in the mother’s home. The court found there was clear and 
convincing evidence that the taxpayers changed their domicile to Illinois, and that the New 
York Tax Commission’s decision to the contrary was arbitrary and capricious. Id.  
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A taxpayer who continues to own a New York residential property 
may establish that she changed her domicile. A taxpayer who moved to 
California due to employment there and remained in California for years 
with no specific intent to return to New York was domiciled in California, 
despite her continued ownership of a home in New York where her 
domestic partner resided.81 Being employed in California full time for 
many years, being physically located in California for most of the year, 
renting a residence she occupied in California, moving personal 
possessions there and other facts caused the court to conclude that there 
was clear and convincing evidence of a change of domicile.82 The more 
evidence the taxpayer is able to introduce to show connections to the new 
domicile the greater the likelihood of a favorable ruling. 
Taxpayers who sell their long term primary New York home and 
relocate to Florida may be able to establish change of domicile, even 
                                                                                                         
81 Gemmel, 2004 WL 2634346.  
82 Id. The taxpayer and her life partner initially lived in New York. They purchased a 
brownstone together, intended for use as part personal residence and part rental units for 
investment. They occupied parts of the brownstone as their residence, while other parts of 
the building underwent renovation. After owning and occupying the brownstone for over 
ten years, the taxpayer accepted a consulting position with a California business, requiring 
her to spend time in both states. Thereafter, she became president and CEO of the business, 
requiring her presence in California full time. Her contemporaneous business records 
documented her presence a majority of time in California, but evidence was lacking about 
where the taxpayer was on any given day. The taxpayer leased a home in California, and 
over time moved personal belongings from New York to California. While the taxpayer 
was living in California the mortgage on the New York home was refinanced, and the loan 
application reflected the taxpayer’s residence address was in California. The taxpayer’s 
written employment agreement with the California business reflected that the parties 
contemplated a long term, rather than a temporary, relationship. Other business documents, 
such as employer provided life insurance, reflected California as the taxpayer’s residence. 
While living in California, the taxpayer occasionally visited New York, staying either at 
the brownstone she owned or with relatives. When the California business was sold, the 
taxpayer remained employed in California with the purchaser under a three year contract. 
The taxpayer, on advice of an accountant, filed state and federal income tax returns as a 
California resident. Nonresident New York State income tax returns were also filed. Other 
facts were introduced to support the assertion that the taxpayer changed her domicile. The 
taxpayer had a California driver’s license, owned and registered a car in California, was 
visited by family and friends in California, employed doctors and dentists in California, 
and decorated her California home. It was only when the taxpayer’s life partner became ill 
that her plans changed and she returned to New York. The court weighed the facts tending 
to show domicile in California against those favoring New York and ruled for the taxpayer. 
Critical to the court’s ruling were the length of time the taxpayer was in California, that a 
majority of time was spent in California each year and the taxpayer’s employment there. 
Adverse facts were present. One was that the taxpayer leased a home in California whereas 
she owned an expensive home in New York. Another was that the taxpayer left tangible 
personal property of nominal value in New York.
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though they purchase another New York vacation property.83 Similarly, a 
taxpayer who retained ownership of his New York residence after 
marrying and permanently relocating to Paris, France, established that he 
changed his domicile84 For many years the taxpayer lived in Connecticut 
with his first wife and their children, while he worked long hours in New 
York City. In 2008 he left his first wife and moved to New York City, 
where he initially rented an apartment and purchased the furniture in it. In 
2009 the taxpayer and his childhood sweetheart agreed to marry as soon 
as they both divorced their spouses. The couple was to live in Paris, 
France. While awaiting entry of divorce decrees, the taxpayer purchased 
an apartment in New York, so his fiancé and her son would have a 
comfortable place to visit with him. In July 2009 the couple married. In 
2010 they purchased an apartment in Paris, and by 2011 the apartment was 
renovated and ready for occupancy. On March 1, 2011 the taxpayer retired 
from his employment in New York, and on March 2, 2011 he moved to 
Paris. Despite retaining ownership of the New York residence, and staying 
in it periodically to receive medical treatment in New York and for 
personal visits for years after the move to Paris, the taxpayer was not 
domiciled in New York during or after 2011.85 
                                                                                                         
83 Burke, 1994 WL 266764 at *13 (totality of the circumstances resulted in a ruling 
favorable to the taxpayers.). The taxpayers lived and worked in New York for many years, 
where they owned a home and two businesses. One business constructed and sold 
residential housing in New York, and a second constructed and rented low income housing 
for the elderly. Id. at *2. The taxpayers’ goal was to build businesses which could function 
without their active involvement and would generate income allowing them to enjoy 
retirement. Having decided to retire and continue ownership of the businesses which owned 
New York real estate, a manager was placed in control of the businesses. By 1985 taxpayers 
moved to Florida, and their active day to day involvement in the businesses declined 
dramatically. The tribunal accepted the taxpayer’s testimony that he averaged two 
telephone calls of less than 15 minutes each weekly to the business’ manager after his 
retirement. His testimony was supported by telephone records and an affidavit of the 
manager. The manager also supported the taxpayer’s assertion that most telephone calls 
and any infrequent visits to the business after his retirement were personal, as the business 
paid many of the taxpayers’ bills. Prior to 1985 the taxpayers owned a condominium in the 
Bahamas. Due to instability there and the inability of the taxpayers to become permanent 
residents of the Bahamas, in 1995 they purchased a Florida residence. Shortly thereafter 
their New York residence was listed for sale, and taxpayers purchased another New York 
vacation home. The taxpayers spent more than 30 days but less than 170 days at the New 
York vacation home thereafter. The former New York home was eventually sold furnished. 
Personal effects were moved to the Florida home, as was their boat. The first Florida 
residence purchased by taxpayers was sold five years later and another Florida home was 
purchased. The taxpayers had only minimal family or social ties to New York after 1985. 
Their personal investments and social activities were in Florida.  
84 In re Patrick, Nos. 826838 and 826839, 2017 WL 2801958, at *13 (N.Y. Div. Tax 
App. June 15, 2017).  
85 Id. The Tax Division claimed that the taxpayer was domiciled in New York, but did 
not assert that he was a statutory resident. Facts considered in reaching the decision 
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Non–U.S. citizenship does not prevent a person who permanently 
resides in New York with an intent to remain from being domiciled in New 
York for income tax purposes.86 However, when a U.S. citizen departs 
New York for a foreign country, the individual remains a New York 
domiciliary unless he can prove an intent to remain in the foreign country 
permanently87 or indefinitely.88 
Once an individual is a New York domiciliary, the pressing question 
is how to terminate that status. “It is well established that an individual’s 
original or selected domicile continues until there is a clear manifestation 
of an intent to acquire a new one.”89 So called “snowbirds” who spend part 
of the year in New York and part in warmer climates such as Florida, are 
particularly vulnerable to determinations that they remain New York 
domiciliaries for income tax purposes.90 Where the taxpayer continues to 
maintain a dwelling in New York, the state makes it challenging to 
terminate status as a domiciliary of New York. “The determination of an 
individual’s domicile is ordinarily based on conduct manifesting an intent 
                                                                                                         
favorable to the taxpayer included that his spouse resided only in Paris, France; in 
connection with the move the taxpayer promptly obtained legal permission from the French 
government to reside in France for the longest period possible; he owned a substantial 
home in Paris; had a French driver’s license; and he paid taxes in France. That the taxpayer 
retained his valuable New York apartment was not determinative, because he stayed there 
to obtain medical treatment only available in New York for a serious ailment. That the 
taxpayer moved to Paris the day after he retired, forfeited financial benefits by retiring 
early, became inactive in a New York club he belonged to, and had no long term residence 
in or family ties to New York, his accountant was not in New York, he did not insure the 
contents of his apartment in New York or have a safe there (whereas he did both in Paris), 
all supported his position that his domicile changed. Facts were present adverse to the 
taxpayer’s position. He remained an inactive member of a gym in New York after his move 
to Paris. He owned and periodically occupied an expensive New York apartment, which 
was neither sold nor converted into an investment property after he moved to Paris. 
Although he retired from his employment as of December 2010, he remained Vice 
Chairman of his former employer until March 1, 2011. After 2011 the taxpayer sat on the 
board of directors of companies located in Colorado and London, requiring attendance in 
2012 at two board meetings held in New York, in addition to meetings held elsewhere. The 
taxpayer continued to receive treatment from medical professionals in New York during 
2011 and thereafter. Tax forms, utility bills and credit card bills were addressed to the 
taxpayer’s New York residence, although he testified that he received them electronically. 
Id. at *7. Finally, the taxpayer spent considerable time in New York during each tax year 
in dispute.  
86 tit. 20, § 105.20(d)(3).  
87 Id.; see also In re Taylor, No. 822824, 2010 WL 2801873, at *9 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. 
July 8, 2010).  
88 McKone v. State Tax Comm’n, 490 N.Y.S. 2d 628, 630 (App. Div. 1985).  
89 Kornblum v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of N.Y., 599 N.Y.S.2d 158, 159 (App. Div. 1993).  
90 See e.g., Kartiganer v. Koenig, 599 N.Y.S.2d 312, 314 (App. Div. 1993); Kornblum, 
599 N.Y.S.2d at 160; Thibault v. State Tax Comm’n, 377 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742 (App. Div. 
1975).  
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to establish a permanent home with permanent associations in a given 
location.”91 “The test of intent with respect to a purported new domicile 
has been stated as ‘whether the place of habitation is the permanent home 
of a person, with the range of sentiment, feeling and permanent association 
with it.’”92 To successfully assert that New York domicile was 
relinquished, the taxpayer must actually establish another domicile.93 A 
seaman in the Merchant Marine does not avoid being domiciled in New 
York when he previously lived in New York, his spouse and child continue 
to live there, he spends over 31 days a year in New York, and he claims to 
have no domicile.94 
Because domicile only exists if the taxpayer’s primary home is in New 
York, and depends on both the taxpayer’s physical presence in New York 
and intent, a variety of factors are reviewed by the courts to determine 
                                                                                                         
91 Clute v. Chu, 484 N.Y.S.2d 239, 241 (App. Div. 1984). In Clute the taxpayer was a 
long time domiciliary of New York, where he resided, managed a family business, held 
other employment positions and owned a home and investment real property. In 
increments, over a period of years, the taxpayer purchased a condominium in Florida, 
married a woman living in Florida, moved some furniture from his New York residence to 
the Florida home, sold the family business, resigned memberships in New York social 
organizations and joined organizations in Florida. The taxpayer attended to traditional 
actions associated with a change of domicile. He filed a declaration of domicile in Florida, 
registered to vote there, amended his Will to reflect Florida residence, registered his car in 
Florida, rented a safe deposit box in Florida and relinquished his box in New York, moved 
his bank account to Florida and filed Florida intangible tax returns. The continued 
ownership of a New York home and other New York real estate, combined with the 
taxpayer’s continued part time occupancy of that home, and his continued business 
interests in New York resulted in a ruling that taxpayer did not relinquish his New York 
domicile.  
92 Bodfish v. Gallman, 378 N.Y.S.2d 138, 140 (App. Div. 1976) (quoting Matter of 
Bourne, 41 N.Y.S.2d 336 (N.Y. Surr.1943)). Bodfish involved a New York domiciliary 
whose employer relocated him to Pakistan, where he lived and worked for three years, at 
which time the employer transferred the taxpayer to London. Because the taxpayer entered 
Pakistan under a four–year visa rather than an immigration visa, initially moved to Pakistan 
without his family who remained in New York until his home was sold, leased multiple 
residences in Pakistan, and periodically returned to New York, he failed to provide clear 
and convincing evidence of an intent to change his domicile.
93 In re Knight, No. 819485, 2006 WL 3350785, at *24 (N.Y. Tax App. Trib. Nov. 9, 
2006).  
94 Oatman v. State Tax. Comm’n, 377 N.Y.S.2d 659, 661 (App. Div. 1975). see also 
Starer v. Gallman, 377 N.Y.S.2d 645, 648 (App. Div. 1975). In Starer the taxpayer lived 
in New York until 1963, when he graduated from high school and entered the U.S. 
Merchant Marine Academy located in New York. Starer, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 648. After 
graduating from the Academy, the taxpayer accepted employment with a New Jersey 
company on a ship. Id. He thereafter resided on the ship. Id. The taxpayer opened a bank 
account in New Jersey and joined a union there. He contended that he planned to eventually 
live in New Jersey. Id. His claim to have abandoned his New York domicile was rejected, 
based on his failure to actually establish a domicile in New Jersey. Id. Thus, he remained 
subject to New York income tax as a resident. Id.  
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presence and intent.95 These factors explained below are viewed as indicia 
or manifestations of the taxpayer’s intent.96 It is the totality of the 
circumstances that leads to a given outcome.97 No single fact is 
controlling.98 The factors are accorded different weight by the courts. 
Certain factors are viewed as self–serving. The consequence is that their 
presence is not very persuasive in favor of the taxpayer’s claimed intent to 
change domicile, but the absence of these factors leads to a determination 
of continued status as a New York domiciliary. “While any evidence 
reflective of intent is admissible, . . . a party’s statements of intent are 
accorded little or no weight and the emphasis is placed rather upon his or 
her conduct . . . .”99 
Typical actions a person permanently departing from New York might 
engage in, such as registering to vote in the jurisdiction of the new 
domicile, insuring and registering vehicles in the new jurisdiction, and 
obtaining a driver’s license there are given “due weight, but they will not 
be conclusive if they are contradicted by such individual’s conduct.”100 
Contrary to most taxpayers’ perception, case law reflects that these acts, 
combined with purchase of a home in the new state and continued 
maintenance a home in New York, are rarely sufficient to prove a change 
in domicile.101 The regulations specifically state that one fact to be 
considered is whether the individual moved to escape New York tax.102 
The time the taxpayer spends in a location is another fact relevant to 
domicile where the taxpayer maintains multiple residences.103 
In the vast majority of reported opinions, the courts uphold the tax 
department’s determination that the taxpayer did not succeed in giving up 
New York domicile. In addition to the individual factors considered by the 
                                                                                                         
95 Gray v. Tax App. Trib. of N.Y., 651 N.Y.S.2d 740, 741 (App. Div. 1997) (“Intent is 
frequently determined by looking to the acts of the party claiming domicile.”).  
96 In re Gemmel, No. 819222, 2004 WL 2634346, at *12 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. Nov. 10, 
2004).  
97 Chancey v. State Tax Comm’n, 415 N.Y.S.2d 491, 492 (App. Div. 1979).  
98 Kartiganer v. Koenig, 599 N.Y.S.2d 312, 314 (App. Div. 1993).  
99 Kornblum v. Tax App. Trib. of N.Y., 599 N.Y.S.2d 158, 159–60 (App. Div. 1993).  
100 tit. 20, § 105.20(d)(2).  
101 See e.g., In re Slotkis, No. 817952, *4, 2002 WL 394249 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. Mar. 
7, 2002) (In the present matter, petitioners obtained a Florida driver’s license and a motor 
vehicle identification card, registered to vote in Florida, filed homestead exemption and 
exemption from ad valorem tax in Florida, executed new wills with their Florida address 
and filed their income tax returns using the Florida address. In reviewing the acts of a 
taxpayer alleging a change in domicile, formal declarations have been held to be less 
persuasive than the informal acts of an individual’s general habit of life).  
102 tit. 20, § 105.20(d)(2).  
103 tit. 20, § 105.20(d)(2). Recall that the taxpayer must establish that he spent no more 
than 30 days in New York during the year to avoid status as a New York domiciliary. N.Y. 
Tax Law § 605(b)(1)(A)(l) (McKinney 2015).  
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courts and noted below, for a taxpayer to prevail she may need to establish 
abrupt definitive change in life style. Where taxpayers slowly, in 
incremental steps, purported to relocate from New York to Florida or 
another state, the incremental steps taken by taxpayers deterred the courts 
from concluding that domicile changed.104 
(a) Time spent in New York. A critical fact considered by the courts 
in determining whether a taxpayer changed his domicile from New York 
to another jurisdiction is the time the taxpayer thereafter spent in New 
York.105 The statute precludes the taxpayer from being present in New 
York for more than thirty days if domicile was changed,106 (or more than 
183 days to avoid status as a statutory resident). A taxpayer needs to 
maintain adequate contemporaneous records of where he is on a daily basis 
to satisfy the strict evidentiary standard.107 Emphasis is placed on whether 
any records submitted by the taxpayer were contemporaneously 
                                                                                                         
104 Slotkis, 2002 WL 394249. The court noted how in 1983 the taxpayers first purchased 
a Florida apartment which they visited three to five times a year. Id. at *2. Thereafter, the 
husband retired and in 1995 the couple purchased a larger Florida apartment in a 
community where relatives lived. Although their plans were interrupted by the wife’s 
illness, the couple eventually spent winters in Florida and summers in New York. Id. Over 
a period of years, the husband first sold his New York business and later his New York 
investment property. Id. One reason for the ruling adverse to the taxpayers was that, due to 
their gradual transition to Florida and continued ties to and contact with New York, there 
was no clear change in the taxpayers’ behavior at any point manifesting an intent to be 
domiciled in Florida. Id.; see also In re Campaniello, No. 825354, 2015 WL 4071393 (N.Y. 
Div. Tax App. June 25, 2015). In that case the taxpayer, initially domiciled in New York, 
purchased a condominium in Florida in 1981. Id. From 1981 until 2007 the taxpayer 
conducted businesses and managed rental real estate he owned in Florida and New York, 
commuting weekly between the two states. Id. There was no evidence of specific definitive 
events reflecting that the taxpayer’s domicile changed or any point in time when this 
occurred. Id.  
105 See Buzzard v. Tax App. Trib. of N.Y., 613 N.Y.S.2d 294, 295 (App. Div. 1994) 
(“Most significantly, in the years in question petitioners [the taxpayers] spent more time in 
New York than in Florida.”); see also In re Patrick, Nos. 826838 & 826839, 2017 WL 
2801958, at *11 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. June 15, 2017); In re Gemmel, No. 819222, 2004 
WL 2634346, at *12 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. Nov. 10, 2004) (citing tit. 20, § 105.20(d)(4)) 
(“This is an (important) fact to be considered in determining . . . domicile.”).  
106 N.Y. Tax Law § 605(b)(1)(A)(i) (McKinney 2015).  
107 See Ingle v. Tax. App. Trib. of N.Y., 973 N.Y.S.2d 877, 880 (App. Div. 2013) (finding 
that testimony from the taxpayer that “she was in Tennessee on an ‘off and on’ basis and 
was in New York ‘periodically’, was not adequate to establish the taxpayer’s location”); 
see also In re Lieberman, No. 824101, 2013 WL 3790595, at *3 (N.Y. Div. Tax. App. July 
11, 2013) (finding that calendar pages for the years in dispute showing where the taxpayers 
allegedly were on each day were not alone adequate evidence of days spent within and 
outside New York); In re Feldman, No. 802955, 1988 WL 168011, at *7 (N.Y. Div. Tax 
App. Sept. 15, 1988) (finding that taxpayers’ testimony about when they visited New York 
combined with copies of their electric bills was not adequate substantiation).  
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maintained.108 Day count summaries provided by a taxpayer’s employer 
reflecting only days she traveled were not sufficient evidence.109 While a 
taxpayer may offer testimony about his presence, supporting 
documentation such as a dairy, telephone records,110 toll receipts, airline 
tickets, hotel bills and credit card charge records, are preferred.111 
In addition to focusing on the number of days during a year in which 
the taxpayer is physically present in the new state compared to days in 
New York, courts view the number of years the taxpayer lives and works 
in the new locale as relevant.112 Even where a taxpayer spends many years 
working in a foreign country while residing there, other factors may result 
in a determination that she did not relinquish her New York domicile.113 
The duration of residence outside New York needs to be clearly tied to 
intent to make the new locale the taxpayer’s domicile for New York 
domicile status to end.114 
(b) Continued maintenance of New York abode.115 One of the most 
critical factors considered by the court is whether the taxpayer continued 
                                                                                                         
108 See Campaniello, 2015 WL 4071393 at *11. The administrative law judge found the 
taxpayer’s non–contemporaneous travel summary allegedly detailing days in New York 
and elsewhere unconvincing, as flight information and expense reports were missing. Id., 
at *12. Similarly, a summary of days in Florida, New York or elsewhere reconstructed by 
the taxpayer long after the year in dispute from his credit card information was found 
incomplete and unconvincing. Id.  
109 Gemmel, 2004 WL 2634346 at *14, n. 1. In that case the court accepted the taxpayer’s 
sworn testimony to establish that she spent a majority of the year outside New York. Id.  
110 In re Knoebel, No. 824117, at *6, 2013 WL 5433719 (N.Y. Div. Tax. App. Sept. 19, 
2013).  
111 Gemmel, 2004 WL 2634346 at *14, n. 1.  
112 Id.; see Chancey v. State Tax Comm’n, 415 N.Y.S.2d 491, 492 (App. Div. 1979) 
(finding that the taxpayer’s presence outside of New York for four consecutive years before 
his return helped to convince the court that his domicile changed); see also Warnecke v. 
Tax App. Trib. of N.Y., 676 N.Y.S.2d 286, at *1–2 (App. Div. 1998) (ruling adverse to the 
taxpayer, a long time New York resident, resulted after he asserted he relinquished his New 
York domicile for only one year following which he reestablished his New York domicile).  
113 In re Taylor, No. 822824, 2010 WL 2801973, at *8 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. July 8, 2010).  
114 Id. In Taylor, the taxpayer was initially a New York resident owning both a primary 
home and a vacation home in New York. She accepted multiple successive limited duration 
job transfers to locations outside the U.S., never selling or renting her New York homes. 
The employer provided the taxpayer with housing abroad and subsidized the cost of 
maintaining one New York home. Although the taxpayer eventually purchased a home in 
England, claimed she would remain there permanently and established social ties in 
England, her continued ownership of the New York residences combined with her retention 
of voting rights, a driver’s license and a New York employer precluded a finding that she 
relinquished her New York domicile.  
115 Both the test for domicile and for statutory resident reference the taxpayer’s 
maintenance of a “permanent place of abode” in New York. For one to be a New York 
domiciliary that abode must be his primary residence. In contrast, under the statutory 
resident test it is accepted that the New York home is not the taxpayer’s primary abode. 
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to maintain a home in New York, but even that important fact is not alone 
determinative of whether the taxpayer’s domicile changed.116 Where the 
taxpayer owned a home in New York and continued to own and occupy it 
after he claimed to have changed his domicile, that fact favored a 
determination that he remained domiciled in New York.117 That was true 
when the taxpayer continued to spend more time in his New York home 
than his new home in Florida, even though his adult child occupied the 
taxpayer’s New York home.118 The same conclusion is reached where the 
taxpayer lives for most of the year in the new locale, but occasionally visits 
her New York residence.119 This conclusion does not change where the 
taxpayer occupies his Florida condominium for a majority of the year, but 
his wife of 51 years remains in their long standing New York residence 
and the taxpayer visits her frequently.120 Similarly, when a taxpayer owned 
                                                                                                         
What constitutes changing a permanent place of abode is addressed here in the context of 
domicile, and in Part IV in the context of a statutory resident.  
116 Gemmel, 2004 WL 263436 at *11; see In re Burke, No. 810631, 1994 WL 266764, at 
*12 (N.Y. Tax App. Trib. June 2, 1994). In Burke the taxpayers did not sell their primary 
New York residence until two years after their move to Florida, and they purchased a 
vacation home in New York. Id. Despite these facts the taxpayers established that their 
domicile changed. Id.  
117 See Clute v. Chu, 484 N.Y.S.2d 239, 241 (App. Div. 1984); Kartiganer v. Koenig, 599 
N.Y.S.2d 312, 314 (App. Div. 1993) (finding that the taxpayer’s continued ownership of 
his New York home after his purchase of a residence in Florida, combined with his 
continued occupancy of the New York home during summer months and sporadically 
through the rest of the year, was strong evidence that he remained domiciled in New York); 
see also Kornblum v. Tax App. Trib. of N.Y., 599 N.Y.S.2d 158, 159 (App. Div. 1993); 
Taylor, 2010 WL 2801873 at *10–11; In re Slotkis, No. 817952, 2002 WL 394249, at *4 
(N.Y. Tax. Div. App. Mar. 7, 2002); but see In re Patrick, Nos. 826838 & 826839, 2017 
WL 2801958, at *13 (N.Y. Div. Tax. App. June 15, 2017) (ruling that the taxpayer’s 
continued ownership and maintenance of an abode in New York did not preclude a finding 
that his domicile changed).  
118 Clute, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 241; see also In re Wechsler, No. 806431, 1991 WL 95626 
(N.Y. Tax App. Trib. May 16, 1991).  
119 Taylor, 2010 WL 2801873 at *11; see In re Campaniello, No. 825354, 2015 WL 
4071393, at *19 (N.Y. Div. Tax. App. June 25, 2015). The court stated that “retention of a 
permanent abode in the location of the historic domicile is a factor in consideration of the 
domicile issue.” Id. Mr. Campaniello generally occupied his New York home from 
Tuesday to Friday and was in Florida on weekends. Id. His schedule varied when he 
traveled abroad. Id.  
120 Campaniello, 2015 WL 4071393 at *20. Mr. Campaniello was originally from Italy. 
Id. He moved to New York to marry his wife. Id. The couple continued to reside in New 
York, purchased a residence there, raised a child there, and the husband worked there. Id. 
Over time the husband expanded his furniture business and real estate investments to 
Florida. Id. He purchased a South Florida apartment which he occupied for most of the 
year. Id. He continued to own businesses and rental real estate in New York and Florida. 
Id. Eventually, he claimed to have changed his domicile to Florida. Id. He and his wife 
filed separate New York income tax returns, as she was a New York resident and he 
claimed he was not. Id. Record keeping for his Florida businesses and real estate 
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homes in New York City and East Hampton, New York, purchased a 
residence in Florida and listed her East Hampton home for sale, but 
continued to live in the East Hampton property from June to November as 
she had previously, she remained domiciled in New York for income tax 
purposes.121 The failure of the taxpayer to spend any more time in Florida 
after her domicile allegedly changed than she had prior to her claimed 
change of domicile affected the court’s adverse determination.122 A change 
in conduct or behavior is needed to establish a change in domicile.123 
Proof that a taxpayer purchased a residence outside New York 
together with his unsupported assertion that he and his spouse resided in 
the new home is not alone adequate to establish a change in domicile.124 
The taxpayer needs to offer further evidence of whether the new home was 
occupied as a primary residence, investment property or vacation home, 
what happened to the lease on the taxpayer’s prior New York residence, 
and similar facts to persuade the court that his prior New York home was 
abandoned as the taxpayer’s primary residence.125 Where the New York 
                                                                                                         
investments was maintained in his New York offices, he continued to visit his family and 
occupy the historic New York home, and many bills were sent to him at his New York 
address. Id. His continued occupancy of the family’s New York home, despite the 
intermittent nature of that occupancy, was one fact leading to the conclusion that he 
remained domiciled in New York. Id.  
121 Thibault v. State Tax Comm’n, 377 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742 (App. Div. 1975). In Thibault, 
prior to 1966 the taxpayer, a married woman, owned two New York homes. Id. In 1966 
she purchased a Florida residence. Id. Two years later she listed the East Hampton property 
for sale, but continued to occupy it until it was sold in 1969. Id. Prior to 1968 the taxpayer 
registered her auto in Florida, maintained a bank account and safe deposit box in Florida, 
and continued to spend time in Florida and New York much as she had previously. Id. The 
taxpayer continued to vote in New York and maintain a bank account there. Id. No Florida 
declaration of domicile was filed until 1969, after the East Hampton property was sold. Id.  
122 Id.; see also In re Lieberman, No. 824101, 2013 WL 3790595, at *5 (N.Y. Div. Tax. 
App. July 11, 2013). In Lieberman, the taxpayers maintained a home in Florida for years 
before claiming to have changed their domicile to Florida. Id. They failed to provide any 
evidence that the time spent in Florida as opposed to New York each year changed in any 
substantial way after they allegedly became domiciled in Florida. Id. This absence of 
evidence of a change in behavior led to the conclusion that they remained domiciled in 
New York. Id.  
123 See Lieberman, 2013 WL 3790595 at *6 (“[w]hat is glaringly missing, other than the 
purchase of houses in Boca Raton, was any evidence of an intent to change their domicile 
to Florida. There was no mention of a daily routine in Florida, much less a social life.”)  
124 El–Tersli v. Comm’r of Tax’n and Fin., 787 N.Y.S.2d 526, 528 (App. Div. 2005).  
125 See id. at 528. The taxpayer and his spouse resided in a rental apartment in New York 
until they purchased a home in New Jersey. Id. The furniture from the rental apartment was 
not moved to the New Jersey house. Id. The taxpayer’s business was operating hot dog 
carts in New York. Id. The taxpayer claimed to have changed his domicile to New Jersey, 
and thus he filed nonresident N.Y. income tax returns. Id. Mr. El–Tersli previously served 
a one–year prison sentence for tax crimes. Id. He failed to offer any evidence about whether 
the New Jersey home was a “primary residence, secondary residence, vacation home, [or] 
rental property”. Id. He claimed that his former New York rental apartment was occupied 
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residence previously occupied by the taxpayer was leased by him, the fact 
that he subleases it while he resides elsewhere does not necessarily 
demonstrate a change in domicile.126 At a minimum, a taxpayer who 
relinquishes a New York rental apartment to live in another state should 
assure that bills for utility service to that apartment do not remain in his 
name and should remove his tangible personal property from the 
apartment, if he claims to have abandoned it as his residence.127 
Where taxpayers sell their New York home but rent a New York 
apartment in which they reside until they purchase a home outside New 
York, they remain domiciled in New York despite their belief that the 
rental is temporary housing.128 The same conclusion is reached when 
taxpayers sell their primary residence in New York and purchase a summer 
cottage in New York which they thereafter occupy for three months 
annually.129 
The taxpayer’s continued ownership of a home in New York does not 
preclude a finding that the taxpayer’s domicile changed.130 This was true 
                                                                                                         
by his father and brother after his move to New Jersey. Id. However, he did not introduce 
into evidence a lease assignment, revised lease, proof of who was paying rent or utilities 
or other documents or witness testimony to support his assertions. Id. Thus, he failed to 
meet the burden of proof that his domicile changed. Id.  
126 Warnecke v. Tax App. Trib. of N.Y., 676 N.Y.S.2d 286, 287 (App. Div. 1998). Mr. 
Warnecke was a famous architect who resided in a rent–stabilized apartment in New York 
until December of 1987. Id. In 1987 he sold his New York office and sublet the apartment 
through June 1989. Id. The taxpayer claimed to have abandoned his New York domicile 
by the end of 1987. Id. In 1998 he spent 56 days in New York, and the rest of his time in 
California, Washington, D.C. and Florida. Id. His next stable residence was in Washington, 
D.C., where he moved in November of 1988. Id. The taxpayer returned to New York in 
1989, at which time he purchased an apartment. Id. Because the taxpayer retained rights to 
his subleased apartment after June 1989, the utility bills were in his name and his tangible 
personal property remained in the subleased apartment during 1988, there was insufficient 
evidence that taxpayer changed his domicile for that year. Id.  
127 See id at 287–88; see also In re Burke, No. 810631, 1994 WL 266764, at *5 (N.Y. 
Tax App. Trib. June 2, 1994). In Burke, the taxpayers’ bills for utilities, credit cards and 
travel expenses were sent to their New York business office for payment. Id. Despite these 
facts, the tribunal held that the taxpayers changed their domicile to Florida. Id.  
128 See Rubin v. Tax App. Trib. of N.Y., 814 N.Y.S.2d 804, 805–06 (App. Div. 2006). 
The issues in Rubin concerned right to innocent spouse relief and abatement of penalties. 
Id.  
129 Shulman v. Tully, 446 N.Y.S.2d 548, 548 (App. Div. 1982). After the sale of their 
primary residence, taxpayers spent at least eight months annually in St. Maarten. Id. In 
light of the three months during which they occupied the New York cottage annually, the 
retention of a New York bank account, New York driver’s licenses and a N.Y. post office 
box, and the lack of intent to relinquish U.S. citizenship, the taxpayers remained domiciled 
in New York. Id.  
130 In re Patrick, Nos. 826838 & 826839, 2017 WL 2801958, at *13 (N.Y. Div. Tax. App. 
June 15, 2017); In re Gemmel, No. 819222, 2004 WL 2634346, at *13 (N.Y. Div. Tax 
App. Nov. 10, 2004).  
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although the taxpayer leased rather than purchased a home in the state to 
which she moved, her life partner continued to occupy the New York 
home, and the home purchase was initially in part an investment to create 
rental income.131 That a former residence was also an investment property 
or was converted to an investment property is relevant to whether domicile 
changed. The reason for the failure to either sell the prior home or convert 
it to investment property may be relevant. A taxpayer’s failure to sell or 
rent her New York cooperative apartment after it ceased to be her primary 
residence did not preclude acknowledgment that she changed her 
domicile, where her former spouse was an owner of the cooperative and 
would not transfer title.132 
Use of the former New York residence after the taxpayer vacates it is 
relevant to a determination of change of domicile. “Retention of a real 
estate investment in New York is less significant than retention of a 
residence for purposes of determining domicile.”133 Where the taxpayer 
initially acquired the New York property for both personal residence and 
investment purposed, the investment motive may continue after the 
taxpayer moves to another state.134 In contrast, when the taxpayers’ adult 
children occupy the taxpayer’s former New York home, that is not likely 
to convince a court that a change of domicile occurred. 
A New York domiciliary who sells his New York home and does not 
purchase or rent another abode in New York State is in a far better position 
to assert that he is no longer a New York resident for state income tax 
purposes. But the fact that the taxpayer does not own or lease a New York 
home immediately after the sale of his primary residence does not preclude 
a finding of continued New York domicile, where in later years the 
taxpayer rents or purchases another New York home and continues other 
contacts with New York.135 Courts at times focus on when the New York 
home was sold, particularly where the taxpayer claims to have changed 
her domicile prior to the sale.136 What is absent from evidence and the 
courts’ determination is instructive. Taxpayers rarely provide evidence of 
how the sale of the former primary residence was treated on their U.S. 
                                                                                                         
131 See Gemmel, 2004 WL 2634346 at *12–13.  
132 In re Alfano, No. 817356, 2001 WL 408759, at *11 (N.Y. Div. Tax. App. April 12, 
2001). A change of domicile occurred, although the taxpayer occasionally occupied the 
New York cooperative after her move to Connecticut. Id.  
133 Gemmel, 2004 WL 2634346 at *13.  
134 In re Taylor, No. 822824, 2010 WL 2801973, at *5 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. July 8, 2010). 
The taxpayer must prove that she converted the residence into an investment property; her 
mere allegation or testimony that her intent changed is not adequate. Id.  
135 Buzzard v. Tax App. Trib. of N.Y., 613 N.Y.S.2d 294, 295 (App. Div. 1994).  
136 See Thibault v. State Tax Comm’n, 377 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742 (App. Div. 1975).  
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income tax returns.137 This information would be relevant due to the 
favorable federal income tax treatment available if the former home sold 
was the taxpayer’s primary residence during two or more years in the five 
years immediately prior to the sale.138 If a taxpayer did not claim exclusion 
of the gain on the former home from federal income tax, this should 
constitute evidence that the taxpayer changed his domicile years before its 
sale. Also relevant would be depreciation and other deductions the 
taxpayer claimed on his federal income tax return on the former residence, 
after the taxpayer vacated the residence, if it was allegedly converted to an 
investment property. 
Even if a taxpayer sells his only residence in New York and reports 
that transaction on his federal income tax return as the sale of a primary 
residence, his other continuing contacts with New York may lead to the 
conclusion that he remains domiciled in New York.139 A taxpayer who 
wishes to relinquish New York domicile and is not ready to sell the home, 
due to economic or other factors, might instead convert the residence to an 
investment property or transfer the residence to an entity. Where the 
taxpayers transferred ownership of their former New York residence over 
a three year period to a partnership owned by their children, this aided in 
proving relinquishment of New York domicile.140 
                                                                                                         
137 But see In re Burke, No. 810631, 1994 WL 266764, at *6 (N.Y. Tax App. Trib. June 
2, 1994). In Burke, the taxpayers reported that they sold their primary New York residence 
two years after they moved to Florida. Id. Their home was listed for sale one year earlier. 
Id.  
138 I.R.C. § 121 (2012). This section permits a married taxpayer who sells a qualifying 
primary residence to exclude up to $500,000.00 in gain realized on the sale from gross 
income and a single taxpayer is permitted to exclude up to $250,000.00 in gain. Id.  
139 Buzzard, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 295. The taxpayers, a married couple, sold their New York 
home and moved to Florida. Id. At that point they neither owned nor rented a home in New 
York. Id. Thereafter, they rented residences in New York which they occupied during the 
summer months, and they eventually purchased vacant land in New York and constructed 
a home there. Id. The husband at all times continued active participation in his New York 
business, and after 1983 served as chairman of the Board of Directors and was a paid 
consultant. Id. These positions necessitated his presence in New York. Id. The taxpayers 
continued to maintain country club memberships in New York and bank accounts there. 
Id. The professionals they consulted, including doctors, attorneys and accountants, were 
all in New York. Id. A critical factor influencing the court’s ruling that the taxpayers’ 
domicile did not change to Florida was that they spent more time in New York than 
elsewhere. Id. The facts that the taxpayers obtained Florida driver’s licenses, registered to 
vote in Florida, actually voted in Florida, were granted a Florida homestead exemption, 
filed Florida intangible tax returns and changed their estate plan documents to reflect 
Florida permanent residence were insufficient to convince the court that the taxpayers’ 
domicile changed. Id.  
140 Gray v. Tax Appeals Trib. of N.Y., 651 N.Y.S.2d 740, 741 (App. Div. 1997). The tax 
years in dispute in Gray were 1987 and 1988. Id. In 1997 taxpayers transferred a 40% 
interest in the home to the partnership. Id. Although in 1998 they still owned a 60% interest, 
based on other facts the court determined that their domicile changed prior to 1998. Id. In 
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(c) Continued employment or business activity in New York. If a 
taxpayer who claims to have moved out of state continues to be gainfully 
employed in New York, that fact supports a determination that he remains 
a New York domiciliary.141 Employment need not be full time to convince 
the court that New York domicile continued, and holding positions as a 
paid director of a New York company or as a consultant to a New York 
business may be adequate.142 A taxpayer who retired from his practice as 
a surgeon in New York, but continued to serve as a paid medical consultant 
to a New York hospital and nursing home remained domiciled in New 
York.143 When a taxpayer was domiciled in New York for over 40 years 
before asserting that he changed his domicile to Florida, his retention of a 
leasehold on real property he actively managed, which included four 
residential rental apartments and a store, supported the decision that he did 
not change his domicile even though he sold the investment property in 
the year he claimed to have changed domicile.144 Where the taxpayer’s 
employer and base of operations is in New York, and the taxpayer is 
repeatedly assigned to work in a foreign country on a short term (one to 
three year) basis, she is still domiciled in New York.145 Operating a 
                                                                                                         
1998 another 40% interest in the New York home was transferred to the partnership, 
followed by a transfer of the remaining 20% in 1999. Id. The opinion is silent about 
consideration paid or its absence, and the transfers to the partnership may have been gifts. 
Id.  
141 In re Zinn v. Tully, 430 N.Y.S.2d 419 (App. Div. 1980), rev’d 426 N.E.2d 484, 484 
(N.Y. 1981); Clute v. Chu, 484 N.Y.S.2d 239, 241–42 (App. Div. 1984). In Zinn, the 
taxpayer and his family moved from New York to Florida in 1967. 426 N.E.2d at 484. 
Although they filed Florida declarations of domicile, registered autos in Florida, voted, and 
maintained bank accounts in Florida, they remained New York residents for income tax 
purposes according to the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, because the 
husband owned and managed a business in New York, retained ownership of a home there 
and filed New York State resident tax returns. Id. In Clute, although the taxpayer sold the 
business in New York by which he was primarily employed, his retention of positions as a 
director of two banks was instrumental in persuading the court that he remained domiciled 
in New York. 484 N.Y.S.2d at 241–42.  
142 Buzzard, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 295. 
143 In re Wechsler, No. 806431, 1991 WL 95626, at *1, *3–4 (N.Y. Tax App. Trib. May 
16, 1991).  
144 In re Slotkis, No. 817952, 2002 WL 394249, at *1, *4 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. March 7, 
2012) Mr. Slotkis owned a New York building, in which he owned and operated a hardware 
store from 1967 to 1993. In 1993 he sold the hardware store but retained ownership of the 
real estate. Id. Four years later the taxpayer sold the real estate to the purchaser of the 
hardware store. Id. at *2.  
145 In re Taylor, No. 822824, 2010 WL 2801873, at *1–2, *10 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. July 
8, 2010) The court carefully scrutinized the terms of the taxpayer’s employment 
arrangement, including whether the employer might require her to return to New York, 
what relocation costs back to New York the employer paid, whether a housing subsidy was 
paid to account for the taxpayer’s continued costs of maintaining a New York home, how 
often the taxpayer returned to New York, and similar factors. Id. The more ties which exist 
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business in New York is likewise viewed as supporting continued 
domicile.146 Retaining an ownership interest in a New York business 
combined with actively participating in that business supports a finding 
that the taxpayer remained domiciled in New York.147 Where the 
taxpayer’s historic home was New York, but over many years he 
conducted a variety of businesses in both New York and Florida, and 
maintained homes in both states, his active management of the businesses 
and maintenance of records for all enterprises in New York supported the 
conclusion that he did not change his domicile to Florida.148 
In contrast, a taxpayer’s full time employment in another state 
requiring his presence in the other state tends to support a finding that 
domicile was changed to the new state.149 A taxpayer’s retirement from his 
                                                                                                         
to New York due to employment and the more the position does not appear permanent, the 
less likely the taxpayer’s domicile will have changed. Id.  
146 See, El–Tersli v. Comm’r of Taxation & Fin., 787 N.Y.S.2d 526, 528 (App. Div. 
2005); Gray v. Tax App. Trib., 651 N.Y.S.2d 740, 741 (App. Div. 1997) (The retention by 
a taxpayer of a controlling interest in a closely held New York corporation, his active 
participation in operation of the corporation, and his maintenance of an office in New York 
all supported the conclusion that he remained domiciled in New York until his stock was 
sold.); see also In re Lieberman, No. 824101, 2013 WL 3790595, at *5–6 (N.Y. Div. Tax. 
App. July 11, 2013).  
147 See Kartiganer v. Koenig, 599 N.Y.S.2d 312, 314 (App. Div. 1993). The taxpayers 
lived solely in New York until 1991, when they purchased a condominium in Florida. The 
taxpayer–husband was an owner of a New York business. Although he was decreasing his 
involvement in the business and he sought to sell the business, no sale occurred and he 
remained active in the business’ operations. A portion of his business activities were 
conducted by telephone or courier, presumably from his home in Florida. Other facts 
existed both in support of and in conflict with the taxpayers’ assertion that they changed 
their domicile to Florida in 1991. In addition to purchasing a Florida home, the taxpayers 
joined “social organizations, opened a checking account, secured a safe deposit box, 
executed codicils to . . . wills and filed a declaration of domicile as residents of Florida”. 
Id. at 314. Florida tax returns were filed. However, the taxpayers retained ownership of 
and occupied their New York home, retained New York driver’s licenses and a New York 
checking account, and the Florida wills directed that probate occur in New York. See also 
Lieberman, 2013 WL 3790595 at *6. Mr. Lieberman owned a New York real estate 
brokerage and management corporation and three New York real estate investment 
companies. His wife worked for his corporation. Although the number of employees of the 
corporation diminished as the taxpayer decreased activity, he continued to manage the 
businesses from his home in Florida and to travel to New York to attend to business. His 
continued active involvement in the business supported the conclusion that he remained 
domiciled in New York.  
148 In re Campaniello, No. 825354, 2015 WL 4071393, at *2–3, *19 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. 
June 25, 2015).  
149 See Chancey v. State Tax Comm’n, 415 N.Y.S.2d 491, 492 (App. Div. 1979); but see 
In re Gemmel, No. 819222, 2004 WL 2634346, at *12 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. Nov. 10, 2004) 
(even where the taxpayer is gainfully employed full time in another jurisdiction, if no new 
domicile is effectively established due to absence of intent to remain in the new jurisdiction 
permanently, the taxpayer remains domiciled in New York.)  
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job is relevant, but not sufficient to compel a conclusion that domicile 
changed when other significant connections with New York remain.150 
Where a taxpayer left New York for employment elsewhere, the courts 
consider whether that new job was expected at the outset to be temporary 
or permanent, and at what point it became permanent.151 A job that is 
clearly temporary at the outset does not support a change in domicile.152 
Financial responsibilities and income generating activities connecting the 
taxpayer to New York, such as his active participation in administering a 
decedent’s estate there and selling estate assets, are indicative that New 
York domicile continued.153 Merely attending board of directors meetings 
in New York for a corporation not based in New York does not alone 
constitute conducting sufficient business to conclude that the taxpayer was 
still domiciled in New York.154 
The taxpayer’s continued ownership of New York businesses does not 
compel the conclusion that his domicile remained in New York, where 
responsibility for management and operation of the business is delegated 
to another.155 Merely benefitting from the income generated by a New 
York business in which the taxpayer owns an interest does not cause him 
to remain domiciled in New York, where the taxpayer is no longer actively 
involved in business operations. 
(d) Ownership or rental of real estate in the new locale. While domicile 
cannot change unless the taxpayer establishes a new domicile outside New 
                                                                                                         
150 Kornblum v. Tax App. Trib., 599 N.Y.S.2d 158, 160 (App. Div. 1993).  
151 See In re Taylor, No. 822824, 2010 WL 2801873, *11 (N.Y. App. Div. July 8, 2010). 
The court examined the terms of the taxpayer’s various employment agreements in effect 
prior to and during the tax years when she was living outside New York. The fact that the 
agreements were of limited duration aided in convincing the court that the intent to 
permanently change domicile was lacking. Id.  
152 In re Santos, No. 820335, 2007 WL 507052, at *6 (N.Y. Div. Tax. App. Feb 1, 2007). 
This is particularly true when the taxpayer’s other actions and failure to act are inconsistent 
with a change in domicile. Id. Mr. Santos moved from New York to California for 
approximately six months after accepting temporary employment. Id. at *2. He arranged 
only temporary housing in California in hotels and a month–to–month rental. Id. He left 
most of his personal belongings in New York, never obtained a California driver’s license 
or relinquished his New York license, did not register to vote in California, joined no 
organization in California, and did not change his telephone number, mailing address for 
bank statements or other mail, and did not relocate his bank account to California. Id. These 
facts justified the conclusion that he remained domiciled in New York. Id. at *6.  
153 Clute v. Chu, 484 N.Y.S.2d 239, 241–42 (App. Div. 1984).  
154 In re Patrick, Nos. 826838 & 826839, 2017 WL 2801958, at *13 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. 
June 15, 2017). This was particularly true as the corporations also held board of directors 
meetings at locations other than New York. Id. at *5.  
155 In re Burke, No. 810631, 1994 WL 266764, at *13 (N.Y. Tax App. Trib. June 2, 
1994). The taxpayer’s involvement in the business’ operations after his move to Florida 
was limited to sporadic personal visits of short duration, and an average of two weekly 
telephone calls of less than 15 minutes each. Id.  
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York, the fact that the taxpayer purchased or rented a home in another state 
is not alone determinative that domicile changed.156 A favorable ruling for 
a taxpayer is not likely to result when she continues to spend considerable 
time at her New York home.157 The sale of one New York residence 
combined with the acquisition of an out of state residence, followed two 
years thereafter by the purchase of another New York residence did not 
result in a finding of change of domicile to the new state.158 A taxpayer 
who rents a home in the state to which he moved may succeed in claiming 
that his New York domicile ended, particularly where he retains no 
personal residence in New York to occupy.159 However, arranging only a 
temporary, short–term rental weakens the taxpayer’s position that he 
intended to remain in the new state permanently.160 Similarly, renting a 
furnished apartment in the new location supports a decision that domicile 
did not change.161 A taxpayer continuing to own a home in New York 
while renting a home in another state may reflect a lack of intent to move 
permanently and lends support to a finding that the taxpayer remained 
domiciled in New York.162 However, where other sufficient factors weigh 
in favor of the taxpayer’s position that domicile changed, the continued 
ownership of a New York home and rental of a residence in a new locale 
need not prevent the taxpayer from prevailing.163 A taxpayer who neither 
purchases nor rents a home in another state, but has the right to occupy a 
                                                                                                         
156 See, e.g., Taylor, 2010 WL 2801873 at *5, *10 The fact that taxpayer purchased a 
home in the United Kingdom and was employed full–time there did not preclude a 
determination that she remained domiciled in New York. Id. This was true although the 
home in the U.K. was larger and more expensive than the taxpayer’s two residences in New 
York. Id.; see also In re Wechsler, No. 806431, 1991 WL 95626, at *2, *6 (N.Y. Tax App. 
Trib. May 16, 1991).  
157 See, e.g., Thibault v. State Tax Comm’n, 377 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742 (App. Div. 1975); 
see also Kartiganer v. Koenig, 599 N.Y.S.2d 312, 314 (App. Div. 1993); Kornblum v. Tax 
App. Trib., 599 N.Y.S.2d 158, 160 (App. Div. 1993); In re Lieberman, No. 824101, 2013 
WL 3790595, at *5 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. July 11, 2013).  
158 Buzzard v. Tax App. Trib., 613 N.Y.S.2d 294, 295 (App. Div. 1994).
159 See Chancey v. State Tax Comm’n, 415 N.Y.S.2d 491, 492 (App. Div. 1979) (where 
taxpayer retained an interest only in his mother’s residence in New York, in which the 
taxpayer had no right to reside); In re Gemmel, No. 819222, 2004 WL 2634346 (N.Y. Div. 
Tax App. Nov. 10, 2004).  
160 In re Santos, No. 820335, 2007 WL 507052, at *2, *6 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. Feb. 1, 
2007).  
161 Id. at *6.  
162 See Gray v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 651 N.Y.S.2d 740 (App. Div. 1997); but see 
Gemmel, 2004 WL 2634346 at *13 (holding that the taxpayer’s domicile changed based 
on other grounds).  
163 See Gemmel, 2004 WL 2634346 at *12 (the taxpayer who owned a home in New York 
and rented one in California successfully changed her domicile. The court focused on the 
taxpayer’s employment and additional facts such as the taxpayer planting a garden and 
moving personal possessions to the rental unit.).  
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residence outside New York and does so, may have established a new 
domicile.164 
(e) Termination of taxpayer’s membership in civic and religious 
organizations in New York, particularly if combined with joining 
comparable organizations in his new state of domicile. While facts 
relevant to this point are frequently included in court opinions, they rarely 
influence an outcome favorable to the taxpayer.165 Their absence may 
injure the taxpayer’s position that he intended to change his domicile.166 A 
taxpayer’s continued membership in New York country clubs after he 
allegedly moved to Florida aided in convincing the court that he remained 
domiciled in New York.167 A taxpayer’s failure to join social or religious 
organizations in the state to which he moves may indicate a lack of intent 
to permanently reside in the new location.168 A taxpayer’s assertion that 
he worked too many hours in his new job to allow him to join or participate 
in such civic, religious or social organizations was not persuasive in 
convincing a court that domicile changed.169 A taxpayer’s actions to 
become a nonresident member of a New York country club and an inactive 
member of a gym in New York were noted by the court in connection with 
the claim that the taxpayer’s domicile changed.170 An active membership 
in a New York health club after the taxpayer permanently moved to 
                                                                                                         
164 See In re Alfano, No. 817356, 2001 WL 408759, at *4, *11 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. Apr. 
12, 2001) (where the taxpayer moved from New York to a Connecticut residence purchased 
by a trust created by the taxpayer’s parents of which the taxpayer was one of several 
beneficiaries).  
165 See Clute v. Chu, 484 N.Y.S.2d 239, 241 (App. Div. 1984); Gray, 651 N.Y.S.2d at 
741; Kartiganer v. Koenig, 599 N.Y.S.2d 312, 314 (App. Div. 1993); Kornblum v. Tax 
Appeals Tribunal, 599 N.Y.S.2d 158, 160 (App. Div. 1993); but see Chancey v. State Tax 
Comm’n, 415 N.Y.S.2d 491 (App. Div. 1979) (the fact that the taxpayers joined a church 
and clubs supported the determination that they were no longer domiciled in New York.); 
In re Burke, No. 810631, 1994 WL 266764, at *4 (N.Y. Tax App. Trib. June 2, 1994) 
(where the taxpayers’ joining a golf club at their new home influenced the tribunal in ruling 
in favor of the taxpayers); Ingle v. Tax App. Trib., 973 N.Y. S.2d 877, 879 (App. Div. 
2013) (the court noted the absence of church or gym membership as influencing a 
decision); In re Lieberman, 2013 WL 3790595 at *5 (the taxpayers did not belong to civic, 
social or religious organizations in New York or elsewhere).  
166 Lieberman, 2013 WL 3790595 at *5 (The taxpayers did not belong to civic, social or 
religious organizations in New York or elsewhere).  
167 See Buzzard v. Tax App. Trib., 613 N.Y.S.2d 294, 295 (App. Div. 1994); but see 
Chancey, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 491 (where the court noted that the taxpayers joined a church 
and clubs in Chicago, lending support to their position that they were no longer domiciled 
in New York).  
168 In re Santos, No. 820335, 2007 WL 507052, at *6 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. Feb. 1, 2007).  
169 Id. at *4.  
170 In re Patrick, Nos. 826838 & 826839, 2017 WL 2801958, *2, *5 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. 
June 15, 2017).  
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Connecticut but continued employment in New York did not preclude a 
determination that her domicile changed.171 
(f) Registering to vote and actually voting. This is yet another fact 
courts note.172 Continuing to remain registered to vote and voting in New 
York is indicative that no change of domicile occurred.173 While a taxpayer 
continuing to vote in New York is used to support a finding of New York 
domicile, a taxpayer registering to vote in the state he moved to is not alone 
very persuasive that domicile changed, particularly if he did not actually 
vote in person in the new state.174 Even if the taxpayer both registered to 
vote and actually voted in the state to which he moved, absent other 
compelling evidence these facts are not terribly persuasive in 
demonstrating a change of domicile.175 Voting both in New York and in 
the new place of residence does not demonstrate a change of domicile.176 
The address a taxpayer reflects on a voter registration is relevant.177 
Despite the relative unimportance of this fact, a taxpayer should register 
to vote and actually vote in person and not by absentee ballot in his new 
state of domicile, as failure to do so supports a government claim that 
domicile did not change. 
(g) Filing a declaration of domicile in the new state. While this is a 
factor indicating intent,178 it is not particularly convincing or determinative 
of the outcome in favor of the taxpayer.179 Where a taxpayer allegedly 
                                                                                                         
171 In re Alfano, No. 817356, 2001 WL 408759, at *10 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. Apr. 12, 
2001).  
172 See, e.g., Gray v. Tax App. Trib., 651 N.Y.S. 740, 741 (App. Div. 1997); Chancey, 
415 N.Y.S.2d at 492; In re Lieberman, No. 824101, 2013 WL 3790595, at *4–5 (N.Y. Div. 
Tax App. July 11, 2013); In re Santos, 2007 WL 507052 at *5.  
173 See Thibault v. State Tax Comm’n, 377 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742 (App. Div. 1975); but see 
Gaied v. Tax App. Trib., 6 N.E.3d 1113, 1114 (N.Y. 2014) (where despite a taxpayer voting 
in New York in one year, the court found he was not domiciled in New York).  
174 See Clute v. Chu, 484 N.Y.S.2d 239, 241 (App. Div. 1984) (where the taxpayer 
claimed to have changed his domicile from New York to Florida in 1976, he registered to 
vote in Florida, but he did not actually vote in 1976); Kartiganer v. Koenig, 599 N.Y.S.2d 
312, 314 (App. Div. 1993) (where the facts that the taxpayer registered to vote in Florida, 
obtained a Florida driver’s license and filed Florida tax returns were not 
dispositive of a change in domicile).  
175 In re Wechsler, No. 806431, 1991 WL 95626, at *4 (N.Y. Tax App. Trib. May 16, 
1991); see also Buzzard v. Tax App. Trib., 613 N.Y.S.2d 294, 294 (App. Div. 1994); 
Kornblum v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 599 N.Y.S.2d 158, 160 (App. Div. 1993).  
176 See In re Taylor, No. 822824, 2010 WL 2801873, at *6, *8 (N.Y. Div. Tax. App. July 
8, 2010) (where the taxpayer voted in both New York and London, England).  
177 See Ingle v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 973 N.Y.S.2d 877, 8880 (App. Div. 2013) (The 
court noted that the taxpayer did not reflect her Tennessee address on voter registration and 
bank documents, but instead used her parents’ Tennessee address. The address reflected 
thus did not support taxpayer’s claim that her domicile changed to her Tennessee address.). 
178 See Gray v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 651 N.Y.S.2d 740, 741 (App. Div. 1997).  
179 See Kartiganer, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 314; Wechsler, 1991 WL 95626 at *6.  
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changed her domicile from New York to Florida, her failure to file an 
affidavit of domicile until a year thereafter was indicative of the taxpayer’s 
intent not to become a permanent resident of Florida in the year she 
asserted.180 A taxpayer’s failure to file a declaration of domicile or to apply 
for a Florida homestead exemption was noted by one court when it found 
an absence of intent to establish Florida domicile.181 Even though “self–
serving,” taxpayers should file the declaration and apply for a homestead 
exemption because courts regularly note these filings or their absence in 
decisions. 182 
(h) Changing estate plan documents to reflect the new place of 
residence. This is another factor the courts note183 but do not rely on 
heavily. This was especially true where a Florida will directed that probate 
occur in New York.184 
(i) Relocating assets. This might include registering vehicles in the 
new state185, moving bank186 and brokerage accounts187 to the new state, 
moving household furnishings and tangible personal property to the new 
state of residence, and relocating valuables in a safe deposit box.188 For 
these facts to have any evidentiary importance favorable to the taxpayer, 
virtually all assets must be moved. That entails closing all New York bank 
and brokerage accounts and ending safe deposit box leases. Opening 
accounts or safe deposit boxes in the new state of residence does not aid 
                                                                                                         
180 Thibault v. State Tax Comm’n, 377 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742 (App. Div. 1975).  
181 In re Campaniello, No. 825354, 2015 WL 4071393, at *15 (N.Y. Div. Tax. App. June 
25, 2015).  
182 Wechsler, 1991 WL 95626 at *6.  
183 See Buzzard v. Tax App. Trib., 613 N.Y.S.2d 294, 295 (App. Div. 1994); see Clute v. 
Chu, 484 N.Y.S.2d 239, 241 (App. Div. 1984); Wechsler, 1991 WL 95626 at *2.  
184 Kartiganer, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 314.  
185 See Clute, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 241; Chancey v. State Tax Coom’n, 415 N.Y.S.2d 491, 
492 (App. Div. 1979).  
186 See Clute, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 241 (bank account was opened in Florida); Chancey, 415 
N.Y.S.2d at 492. See also In re Santos, No. 820335, 2007 WL 507052, at *6 (N.Y. Div. 
Tax. App. Feb. 1, 2007) (where the taxpayer’s failure to move his bank account to 
California from New York, combined with his failure to change the address to which bank 
statements were sent from his New York address, militated in favor of a determination that 
his domicile did not change).  
187 See Kornblum v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 599 N.Y.S.2d 158, 160 (App. Div. 1993) (A 
taxpayer’s continued maintenance of bank accounts, brokerage accounts and a bank safe 
deposit box in New York after a move to Florida contributed to ruling that domicile did 
not change.); In re Burke, 1994 WL 266764 at *5, *8 (Moving $2,000,000.00 in treasury 
bills, CDs and cash to the new place of residence aided in supporting the conclusion that 
the taxpayers changed their domicile.).  
188 Kartiganer, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 314. See also In re Patrick, Nos. 826838 and 826839, 
2017 WL 2801958, at *5 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. June 15, 2017) (where the facts that the 
taxpayer did not insure the contents of his New York apartment or install a safe there but 
did insure the contents of his home in Paris, France and installed a safe there supported the 
conclusion that the taxpayer’s domicile changed).  
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the taxpayer’s case where old accounts or boxes remain.189 The positive 
effect of these acts is diminished where the taxpayer continues to maintain 
bank accounts in New York.190 Where prior to the time the taxpayer 
claimed to have changed her domicile from New York to Florida she 
already registered her vehicle in Florida, maintained a Florida bank 
account and safe deposit box, because there was no change these facts did 
not support a conclusion that the taxpayer’s domicile changed.191 Where a 
taxpayer fails to relocate assets to the state to which he moves, and instead 
leaves bank accounts in New York, this indicates to the court that no 
change of domicile occurred.192 So does continuing to receive bank or 
brokerage statements at the taxpayer’s New York residence address.193 
Whether the taxpayer moved furniture, household furnishings and 
other personal effects from New York to a home elsewhere is relevant. 
Where the taxpayer does so, this supports a determination that New York 
domicile ended.194 A contrary conclusion is reached when furnishings and 
personal effects remain in the prior New York home, which the taxpayer 
continues to rent or own, and new furnishings are acquired for the out of 
state home.195 The same conclusion is reached when the new home is 
                                                                                                         
189 See In re Lieberman, No. 824101, 2013 WL 3790595, at *3 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. July 
11, 2013) (Where the taxpayers maintained safe deposit boxes in New York and Florida, 
this fact was viewed as supporting the determination that they did not change their 
domicile.).  
190 Kartiganer, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 314. But see In re Alfano, No. 817356, 2001 WL 408759, 
at *10 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. April 12, 2001) (where the existence of a bank account in New 
York, and where the taxpayer was employed, did not alter the conclusion that her domicile 
changed to Connecticut).  
191 Thibault v. State Tax Comm’n, 377 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742 (App. Div. 1975).  
192 See Gray v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 651 N.Y.S.2d 740, 741 (App. Div. 1997); Buzzard 
v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 613 N.Y.S.2d 294, 295 (App. Div. 1994).  
193 In re Santos, No. 820335, 2007 WL 507052, at *6 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. February 1, 
2007).  
194 See Chancey v. State Tax Comm’n, 415 N.Y.S.2d 491, 492 (App. Div. 1979). See 
also McKone v. State Tax Comm’n, 490 N.Y.S.2d 628, 629 (App. Div. 1985); In re Burke, 
No. 810631, 1994 WL 266764, at *10 (N.Y. Tax App. Trib. June 2, 1994) (where the 
taxpayers sold their New York home furnished but moved substantial personal effects to 
the new Florida residence).  
195 Kornblum v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 599 N.Y.S.2d 158, 160 (App. Div. 1993); Clute 
v. Chu, 484 N.Y.S.2d 239, 241 (App. Div. 1984). See Ingle v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 973 
N.Y.S.2d 877, 880 (App. Div. 2013) (where the taxpayer furnishing her home out of New 
York with borrowed and newly purchased items, rather than moving tangible personal 
property from the New York home, did not support a change of domicile); Warnecke v. 
Tax Appeals Tribunal, 676 N.Y.S.2d 286, 287–88 (App. Div. 1998) (where the taxpayer’s 
sublease of his New York apartment, in which he left his furniture, artwork and tangible 
personal property, led to the conclusion that he had not changed his domicile). See also In 
re Lieberman, No. 824101, 2013 WL 3790595, at *5 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. July 11, 2013); 
In re Taylor, No. 822824, 2010 WL 2801873, at *5 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. July 8, 2010); In 
re Slotkis, No. 817952, 2002 WL 394249, at *5 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. March 7, 2002) 
36 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:1 

acquired furnished and tangible personal property remains unchanged in 
the New York residence.196 Where the taxpayer leaves the vast majority of 
his personal belongings and clothing in his New York home occupied by 
his wife, and has an automobile to use while at that New York home, he 
does not establish that he abandoned his New York domicile.197 This 
conclusion was upheld despite the taxpayer’s claim that the objects that 
mattered most to him, including his sailboat, espresso machine, Italian 
doctorial diploma, classic concert guitar, and his Ferrari, were all in 
Florida.198 A taxpayer who moved from his parents’ New York rental 
apartment to California for a temporary job assignment, leaving most of 
his furniture in his parents’ apartment, did not prove intent to change 
domicile.199 
(j) Filing state tax returns in the new state of domicile; address on 
federal tax returns. These factors are noted by courts,200 but are not overly 
persuasive. One reason for the lack of importance accorded these factors 
may be that taxpayers are usually diminishing the state taxes they owe, 
either by relocating to a state with lower taxes or no taxes. Noticeably 
absent from the reported cases was evidence offered by taxpayers that their 
tax burden increased as a result of the move.201 
                                                                                                         
(where the administrative law judge stated petitioners did not take any of their furniture 
from their Brooklyn house to Florida, as they intended to continue to use this home during 
their stays in New York, which is a strong factor in deciding that they did not intend to 
give up their New York domicile and make the Florida condominium their permanent 
home). But see In re Patrick, Nos. 826838 and 826839, 2017 WL 2801958, at *5 (N.Y. 
Div. Tax App. June 15, 2017) (where the taxpayer’s failure to move his tangible personal 
property other than an antique watch collection did not alter the decision that the taxpayer’s 
domicile changed).  
196 See Lieberman, 2013 WL 3790595 at *2 (where the taxpayers’ assertion that their 
New York furniture was not suitable for their Florida home did not further their case).  
197 In re Campaniello, No. 825354, 2015 WL 4071393, at *19 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. June 
25, 2015).  
198 Id. at *21.  
199 In re Santos, No. 820335, 2007 WL 507052, at *6 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. Feb. 1, 2007).  
200 See Buzzard v. Tax App. Trib., 613 N.Y.S.2d 294, 294 (App. Div. 1994); Kartiganer 
v. Koenig, 599 N.Y.S.2d 312, 314 (App. Div. 1993); Clute, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 241; In re 
Burke, No. 810631, 1994 WL 266764, at *6 (N.Y. Tax App. Trib. June 2, 1994) (In Clute 
and Burke, the taxpayers filed intangible tax returns in Florida after they claimed to have 
relocated to that state.). See also Taylor, 2010 WL 2801873 at *6 (where the taxpayer paid 
considerable taxes as a resident of the United Kingdom but was still determined to be 
domiciled in New York).  
201 But see Taylor, 2010 WL 2801873 at *6 (where the taxpayer paid considerable tax as 
a resident of the United Kingdom, and nevertheless was held not to have permanently 
changed her domicile); In re Patrick, Nos. 826838 and 826839, 2017 WL 2801958, at *6 
(N.Y. Div. Tax App. June 15, 2017) (where the fact that the taxpayer filed tax returns and 
paid taxes in his new location, Paris, France, supported the conclusion that his domicile 
changed and his New York tax returns were properly filed as a nonresident).  
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A taxpayer who claims to have changed his or her domicile would be 
expected to reflect the new home address on any federal tax returns 
thereafter filed. The Internal Revenue Service coordinates with state tax 
departments.202 If a taxpayer reflects a New York residence on his federal 
income tax return but does not file a New York income tax return, an audit 
may be triggered at the state level.203 
(k) Tax consequences of move.204 Courts are authorized to consider 
the state income tax consequences resulting in deciding the validity of the 
taxpayer’s claim that New York domicile was relinquished. This is an 
important factor, as the timing of the alleged change of domicile may alter 
the tax consequences. Where a New York domiciliary relocated to 
Tennessee during the year, a dispute existed about the timing of her change 
in domicile.205 The taxpayer’s employer sold the business in which the 
taxpayer owned stock.206 Aware that she would realize a large capital gain 
on her stock and owe considerable New York income tax, the taxpayer 
hastened her move back to Tennessee.207 The fact that the taxpayer was 
attempting to avoid New York State income tax was one reason supporting 
the conclusion that she did not establish by clear and convincing evidence 
that her domicile changed to Tennessee prior to the stock sale.208 
                                                                                                         
202 See, e.g., In re Estate of Gucci, No. 812160, 1997 WL 413921, at *2 (N.Y. Tax App. 
Trib. July 10, 1997).  
203 See In re Santos, 2007 WL 507052 at *1–2 (The taxpayer used his parents’ permanent 
home address as his address on his federal income tax return. Although the taxpayer had 
lived with his parents, he claimed, unsuccessfully, to be permanently domiciled in 
California during the year in question.).  
204 tit. 20, § 105.20(d)(2) (addressing whether an alleged change in domicile was merely 
to escape taxation).  
205 Ingle v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 973 N.Y.S.2d 877, 878 (App. Div. 2013).  
206 Id. at 879–80.  
207 Id.  
208 Id. at 881. In Ingle the taxpayer was originally from Tennessee. In 2000 she moved to 
New York due to a change in employment. Other than being employed in New York and 
leasing an apartment there, the traditional indicia of domicile were absent. The taxpayer 
“never owned or leased a car in New York, never had a safe deposit box in New York, 
never owned a burial plot, joined a club or organization, had a gym membership, went to 
church in or had an accountant, lawyer or will in New York.” Id. at 879–80. The opinion 
does not reflect whether the taxpayer registered to vote or actually voted in New York or 
used services of doctors or dentists in New York. The taxpayer’s job required her to travel 
frequently “and she was able to work from anywhere as long as she had her cell phone, 
laptop computer and access to an airport.” A dispute arose about when the taxpayer 
abandoned her New York domicile and became domiciled in Tennessee. On April 30, 2004 
the taxpayer sold stock at a gain. If she was still a New York resident when the stock was 
sold $255,000.00 was owed in New York income tax. The taxpayer unsuccessfully asserted 
that she moved back to Tennessee on or before April 1st, whereas the Tax Department 
claimed the move occurred on June 30th. The taxpayer’s New York apartment lease 
expired on April 30, 2004. However, she signed a two–year lease extension. She also leased 
an apartment in Tennessee commencing on April 1, 2004. As of April 1, 2004 the taxpayer 
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(l) Location of professional advisors. When after a move out of New 
York the taxpayer continues to avail himself of the professional services 
of advisors in New York, such as accountants, lawyers, doctors and 
dentists, this fact militates in favor of a finding that the taxpayer continued 
to be domiciled in New York.209 A taxpayer who underwent surgery in 
New York and continued to seek medical treatment from his New York 
physician remained domiciled in New York, although this physician’s 
advice that the taxpayer live in a warmer climate was claimed to have 
motivated a change of domicile.210 A contrary conclusion was reached 
where the taxpayer exclusively used the services of doctors, dentists and 
hairdressers in her new locale.211 Even a taxpayer who receives care from 
medical professionals both within and outside New York may have 
relinquished New York domicile.212 
(m) Reflecting change of domicile on legal documents. That a 
taxpayer reflected Florida as his primary residence on legal documents 
after he claimed to have abandoned his New York domicile does not 
generally alter the court’s decision that he remained a New York 
                                                                                                         
had a Tennessee bank account. On April 30, 2004 her employer deposited a payment owed 
to that account. As of April 2, 2004 the taxpayer registered to vote in Tennessee, and on 
April 13, 2004 she arranged for telephone service to the Tennessee apartment. The 
Tennessee voter registration and bank statement reflected the taxpayer’s parents’ address, 
rather than her apartment, as her permanent address. The taxpayer did not, prior to April 
1st, move her belongings from the New York apartment to her Tennessee rental unit. 
Instead, the New York apartment lease was terminated on June 30, 2004, and that 
apartment was not vacated until July 9, 2004. The taxpayer lacked adequate records 
documenting where she was physically present each day after April 1, 2004. As a 
consequence, the court affirmed the decision that the taxpayer’s domicile did not change 
until July.  
209 See Buzzard v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 613 N.Y.S.2d 294, 295 (App. Div. 1994). See 
also Kornblum v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 599 N.Y.S.2d 158, 160 (App. Div. 1993) (wife 
of taxpayer continued treatment with New York doctor after moving to Florida). However, 
where a taxpayer established that he continued to receive medical care from physicians in 
New York after moving elsewhere, only because they were the only physicians capable of 
treating his unique, life threatening medical condition, a contrary result was reached. In re 
Patrick, Nos. 826838 and 826839, 2017 WL 2801958, at *6–7, 13 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. 
June 15, 2017).  
210 In re Campaniello, No. 825354, 2015 WL 4071393, at *5, *16, *21 (N.Y. Div. Tax 
App. June 25, 2015).  
211 In re Gemmel, No. 819222, 2004 WL 2634346, at *8, 14 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. 
November 10, 2004). See also Gray v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 651 N.Y.S.2d 740, 741 (App. 
Div. 1997); In re Burke, No. 810631, 1994 WL 266764, at *8 (N.Y. Tax App. Trib. June 
2, 1994). In Burke the taxpayers sought medical and optical care from Florida professionals 
once they left New York. Id. Any medical care they required thereafter while visiting New 
York was provided by a family friend there. Id. The accountant for their business was 
changed to a firm in Georgia at the request of another business owner. Id. at *6.  
212 In re Alfano, No. 817356, 2001 WL 408759, at *5 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. April 12, 
2001).  
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domiciliary based on other more important facts. Where there is no 
permanent abode in New York, the taxpayer proves his full time 
employment outside New York and other more determinative factors favor 
the taxpayer, his case is supported by changing his address on his 
passport,213 arranging a home telephone listing in the new state214 and 
reflecting the new home address on a federal income tax return filed.215 A 
taxpayer may sign loan applications, applications for life insurance, wills 
and related estate plan documents216 and other documents. It is important 
for the taxpayer’s new home address to be consistently reflected. When 
IRS Forms 1099, Forms K–1 or other documents submitted to the Internal 
Revenue Service by third parties reflect a New York address for the 
taxpayer, that information is likely to be shared with New York State and 
may trigger an audit.217 Tax forms, bills or other legal or financial 
communications sent to the taxpayer at a New York address support a 
finding that domicile did not change. That the taxpayer signed wills in 
New York, drafted by New York counsel, stating that the taxpayer resided 
in Florida, was noted by the tribunal but had no significant impact on the 
outcome, particularly where the wills were later revised in Florida.218 
(n) Historical home and location of family ties.219 The taxpayer’s 
continued relationships and contacts with family and friends in New York 
militates against a finding of change in domicile.220 This is particularly 
true where the taxpayer’s spouse, adult child and the child’s family 
continue to reside in New York, although the taxpayer asserts that his 
domicile changed to Florida.221 This factor is secondary, of lesser 
importance, and may be negated where the taxpayer is in touch with family 
members in New York and elsewhere.222 The fact that the taxpayers’ close 
relatives do not reside in New York is unlikely to have much impact on 
                                                                                                         
213 Gray, 651 N.Y.S.2d at 741; Chancey v. State Tax Comm’n, 415 N.Y.S.2d 491, 492 
(App. Div. 1979).  
214 Chancey, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 492.  
215 Id.  
216 Gray, 651 N.Y.S.2d at 741.  
217 In re Knight, No. 819485, 2006 WL 3350785, at *2 (N.Y. Tax App. Trib. Nov. 9, 
2006).  
218 In re Burke, No. 810631, 1994 WL 266764, at *6 (N.Y. Tax App. Trib. June 2, 1994).  
219 In re Lieberman No. 824101, 2013 WL 3790595, at *5 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. July 11, 
2013); In re Gemmel, No. 819222, 2004 WL 2634346, at *11, 13 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. 
Nov. 10, 2004).  
220 Buzzard v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 613 N.Y.S.2d 294, 294 (App. Div. 1994); see also 
In re Slotkis, No. 817952, 2002 WL 394249, at *1–4 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. Mar. 7, 2002).  
221 In re Campaniello, No. 825354, 2015 WL 4071393, at *16 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. June 
25, 2015).  
222 Gemmel, 2004 WL 2634346 at *14.  
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the ultimate decision about their domicile.223 A taxpayer leaving New 
York to return to the place he was raised, where other family members 
reside, supports a finding that domicile changed.224 
(o) Driver’s license, auto registration and insurance. Acquiring a 
driver’s license, and registering and insuring a vehicle in the new state of 
alleged domicile are facts regularly presented to the courts.225 When the 
taxpayer continues to maintain, register and insure vehicles in both states, 
those facts indicate that no change of domicile occurred.226 The failure to 
change a driver’s license, auto registration and insurance is viewed as 
supporting continued New York domicile.227 Proof that the taxpayer 
attended to these changes is not alone terribly persuasive of a change of 
domicile. They need to be connected to other more significant factors. The 
taxpayer obtaining a driver’s license in the state to which he moves is not 
indicative of a change in domicile where he neglects to relinquish his New 
York driver’s license.228 Retention of driver’s licenses in both states did 
not preclude the conclusion that the taxpayers changed their domicile, 
when the taxpayers believed a Florida license would not be adequate for a 
person present in New York in excess of 30 days.229 
(p) Charitable contributions. The fact that a taxpayer shifts the 
charitable organizations to which he contributes from those in New York 
to those in the new state in which he resides is not of great consequence. 
Yet it supports the taxpayer’s assertion that his domicile changed.230 
                                                                                                         
223 See, e.g., Lieberman, 2013 WL 3790595 at *2 (where the taxpayers’ children lived in 
Florida, Connecticut and Arizona, yet taxpayers remained domiciled in New York after 
acquiring a home in Florida.). See also Burke, 1994 WL 266764 at *6. Taxpayers’ only 
living son resided in Florida. Id. Children of the taxpayers’ deceased son lived in New 
York, but taxpayers had little contact with them. Id. The tribunal was influenced by the 
facts that taxpayers’ friends and social life were principally in Florida. Id.  
224 McKone v. State Tax Comm’n, 490 N.Y.S. 2d 628, 628 (App. Div. 1985). See In re 
Alfano, No. 817356, 2001 WL 408759, at *9 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. Apr. 12, 2001) The 
taxpayer was originally from Connecticut, where her parents and siblings still lived. Id. 
The taxpayer moved to New York, where she worked and lived with her spouse. Id. Marital 
discord caused her to return to reside in Connecticut. Id. These facts supported a 
determination that the taxpayer’s domicile changed to Connecticut. Id.  
225 Gemmel, 2004 WL 2634346 at *8, 12; see Gray v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 651 
N.Y.S.2d 740, 741 (App. Div. 1997); Campaniello, 2015 WL 4071393 at *14, *21; 
Lieberman, 2013 WL 3790595 at *6.  
226 See Campaniello, 2015 WL 4071393 at *10–11 (where the taxpayer maintained and 
used vehicles both in New York and Florida).  
227 In re Santos, No. 820335, 2007 WL 507052, at *6 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. Feb. 1, 2007).  
228 Kartiganer v. Koenig, 599 N.Y.S. 2d 312, 314 (App. Div. 1993); In re Taylor, No. 
822824, 2010 WL 2801873, at *6 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. July 8, 2010).  
229 In re Burke, No. 810631, 1994 WL 266764, at *7 (N.Y. Tax App. Trib. June 2, 1994) 
The taxpayer husband also had a New York license to operate heavy equipment; although 
he did not cancel the license, he had not used it for 15 years.  
230 Gray, 651 N.Y.S.2d at 741.  
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(q) Ownership of other real estate. In reviewing a taxpayer’s 
continuing ties to New York, ownership of real estate other than a 
residence may be considered. One fact noted as relevant in showing ties to 
New York is whether the taxpayer owned a burial plot in New York.231 As 
noted earlier, the taxpayer’s continued ownership and active management 
of investment real estate may lead to a finding that domicile did not 
change. 
(r) Residence related litigation. A taxpayer defending against a lawsuit 
commenced by his landlord, in which the landlord questioned whether the 
rent–stabilized apartment occupied by the taxpayer was his primary 
residence, was supportive of the court’s decision that the taxpayer did not 
change his New York domicile, although the litigation occurred in years 
prior to the claimed relocation.232 
(s) Where the taxpayer received mail. Assuming that the taxpayer has 
documentation to establish where mail was addressed to him, this fact may 
be indicative of a change of domicile. A taxpayer able to establish that 
social security checks, all utility, insurance and other bills, bank and 
brokerage statements, and all meaningful correspondence was addressed 
to his new home outside New York is in a better position to prove that his 
domicile changed. Conversely, where the taxpayer continues to receive 
bills, bank and brokerage statements and other important communications 
at his New York address, domicile likely remains New York.233 As 
individuals continue to receive more communications electronically, the 
importance of this fact may diminish. Until then, a taxpayer should assure 
that all communications are properly addressed to his new residence. 
(t) Miscellaneous Facts. Apparently inconsequential facts and 
documents have been introduced by taxpayers in an attempt to convince a 
court of a change in domicile and by the government to persuade a court 
otherwise. In one case a taxpayer’s evidence included his Florida library 
card.234 Another taxpayer unsuccessfully asserted that a provision in her 
Last Will and Testament directing that her cremated remains be scattered 
in London reflected her intent to live there permanently.235 The existence 
of a New York pistol permit did not preclude a finding that a taxpayer 
changed his domicile, when the gun was located in Florida.236 Similarly, 
the fact that the taxpayer held a New York insurance broker’s license was 
                                                                                                         
231 Ingle v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 973 N.Y.S.2d 877, 879 (App. Div. 2013).  
232 Warnecke v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 676 N.Y.S.2d 286, 287 (App. Div. 1998). 
233 See, e.g., In re Campaniello, No. 825354, 2015 WL 4071393, at *6 (N.Y. Div. Tax. 
App. June 25, 2015) (where the court noted where mail sent to the taxpayer was addressed).  
234 Kornblum v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of N.Y., 599 N.Y.S.2d 158, 160 (App. Div. 1993); 
see e.g., Burke, 1994 WL 266764.  
235 In re Taylor, No. 822824, 2010 WL 2801873 at *6 (N.Y. Div. Tax. App. July 8, 2010).  
236 Burke, 1994 WL 266764 at *7.  
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not determinative of domicile, particularly as no insurance business was 
conducted.237 
(u) Reason for move. The reason motivating a taxpayer’s move out of 
New York is immaterial, except insofar at the motivation for the move 
reflects intent.238 At times the reasons for relocation influence the tribunal. 
Where a taxpayer moved from New York to Connecticut to escape the 
New York residence she owned and occupied with her spouse whom she 
thereafter divorced, the tribunal was persuaded that she changed her 
domicile to Connecticut.239 The opinion noted both facts relied on by the 
taxpayer and those relied on by the Commission.240 In concluding that the 
taxpayer relinquished New York domicile, it was noted that the case 
presented “a very unique situation where a high level successful business 
executive who was facing divorce sought to live near her family in 
Connecticut.”241 
A taxpayer’s ability to provide documentary evidence to support his 
assertions is critical. The greater the documentation available, the less 
likely the court will find that the taxpayer lacks credibility.242 
                                                                                                         
237 Id.  
238 In re Newcomb’s Estate, 192 N.Y. 238, 250–51 (1908); In re Alfano, No. 817356, 
2001 WL 408759, at *8 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. Apr. 12, 2001).  
239 Alfano, 2001 WL 408759 at *8.  
240 Id. The taxpayer was originally from Connecticut, where her parents and siblings 
continued to reside. She moved to New York due to her employment there and her marriage 
to her first husband. They occupied a New York City cooperative titled in their names, for 
which the taxpayer’s parents provided one–half of the consideration. The taxpayer 
separated from her spouse, and moved into a Connecticut residence owned by a trust 
created by her parents. She moved her belongings to the Connecticut home and purchased 
furnishings for it. While the taxpayer remained employed in New York, she altered her 
work schedule to spend most of each week in Connecticut, at least when she was not 
traveling elsewhere for business. The taxpayer’s job required significant travel worldwide. 
The taxpayer eventually instituted an action for dissolution of her marriage in Connecticut, 
asserting that she was a permanent residence of Connecticut for at least a year. She married 
her second husband in Connecticut, filed Connecticut tax returns, signed a will in 
Connecticut, and obtained a Connecticut driver’s license and safe deposit box. The 
taxpayer continued to own a New York bank account and the New York cooperative 
apartment, and occasionally stayed in the apartment. The taxpayer was unable to sell the 
New York cooperative, because her former spouse was an owner and refused to vacate the 
apartment or transfer ownership to the taxpayer. The taxpayer received mail in New York, 
received medical care in New York and elsewhere, and belonging to a New York heath 
club. Id. at *10–11.  
241 Id. at *11.  
242 Compare Ingle v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of N.Y., 973 N.Y.S.2d 877 (App. Div. 2013), 
where the court stated that the taxpayer’s “overall credibility was undermined by the lack 
of evidence to corroborate much of her testimony, her vague and evasive testimony 
regarding certain key facts, as well as some conflicting testimony given by her boyfriend”, 
Id. at 880, with In re Gemmel, No. 819222, 2004 WL 2634346 (N.Y. Div. Tax. App. Nov. 
10, 2004), where the court found the taxpayer’s testimony credible. See also In re 
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Where the taxing authorities assert that a taxpayer historically 
domiciled outside New York changed his domicile to New York, the 
government has the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence.243 
A taxpayer who lived for years only in New Jersey, worked in New York, 
and after separating from his wife moved into his parents’ New Jersey 
home did not change his domicile to New York by spending time at his 
girlfriend’s New York apartment or at a New York apartment rented by a 
business of which he was a minority owner.244 Because the taxpayer never 
intended to become domiciled in New York, took no action to establish a 
domicile there, and eventually changed his domicile from New Jersey to 
Connecticut, he never became domiciled in New York, despite the 
considerable time he was present in New York each year.245 
A question may also arise about whether an individual previously 
domiciled outside of New York becomes a New York domiciliary by 
entering a nursing home in New York for care. Because intent is an 
element of establishing domicile, when a permanent resident of another 
state enters a New York nursing home on the advice and instruction of a 
                                                                                                         
Campaniello, No. 825354, 2015 WL 4071393 (N.Y. Div. Tax. App. June 25, 2015). In that 
case the taxpayer made a variety of assertions in support of his position that his domicile 
changed to Florida. However, he lacked documentation to establish that they were true. To 
prove his whereabouts on each day of the years in dispute, the taxpayer submitted a log 
prepared years later, and the passport, credit card statements and cell phone statements on 
which the log was based. Id. at *7. Not only did these documents reflect that they were sent 
to the taxpayer’s New York address, but they were inadequate as airline tickets, flight 
details and expense reports were missing, and the documents provided did not account for 
all tax years in dispute. Id. at *8, 12. Tax returns allegedly filed for some of the taxpayer’s 
businesses were not provided. Id. at *11. 
243 In re Knight, No. 819485, 2006 WL 3350785 at *24 (N.Y. Tax App. Trib. Nov. 9, 
2006).  
244 Id. The government based its case on the taxpayer’s significant contacts to New York. 
Id. He worked primarily in New York, parked his car at the apartment leased by the limited 
liability company he worked for and owned a minority (40%) interest in, and spent in 
excess of 183 days annually in New York. Id. However, he did not personally pay to rent 
a New York apartment or to furnish it, and was not personally responsible for paying utility 
bills. Id. Nor did the taxpayer have unlimited or unrestricted access to either the LLC’s 
apartment, also used by other LLC members and LLC clients, or his girlfriend’s apartment. 
Id. The taxpayer stayed at the LLC apartment once a month, and at his girlfriend’s 
apartment once a week. Id.  
245 Id. This opinion reflects how detailed the investigation is into the taxpayer’s affairs 
and how no fact is too unimportant to raise. Id. In addition to obvious facts, such as where 
the taxpayer owned homes, actually slept, stored his personal belongings and voted, the 
court considered why the taxpayer lived in his parents’ home, his father’s terminal illness 
keeping him in New Jersey, the location of his children and in–laws in New Jersey, and his 
presence there coaching his son’s sports teams. Id. The taxpayer’s credit card bills and 
telephone bills were thoroughly analyzed to ascertain his location on a daily basis. Despite 
the taxpayer’s membership in New York social clubs and employment in New York he 
never manifested any intent to become a New York resident. Id.  
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physician to obtain care needed due to physical or mental incapacity, that 
individual does not become a New York domiciliary.246 This conclusion 
was reached by the Commissioner of Taxation and Finance in an Advisory 
Opinion, even though it was anticipated that the taxpayer would remain in 
the New York nursing home for the rest of her life.247` 
IV. STATUTORY N.Y. RESIDENT – WHO IS PRESENT ENOUGH (OR 
TOO MUCH) 
Considerable litigation resulted over the years about whether a 
taxpayer is a statutory resident.248 A statutory resident, as explained 
previously, is a person who admittedly is domiciled outside New York but 
who (1) “maintains a permanent place of abode” in New York State; (2) 
spends more than 183 days in New York State; and (3) is not in active 
service in the armed forces.249 The first requirement was addressed in Part 
II of this Article, where the concepts of “maintains”, “permanent,” and 
“place of abode” were considered. The second requirement can be viewed 
as consisting of three parts: what constitutes a “day”; what counts as 
“presence”; and what is the substantiated day count. The substantial day 
count depends on whether the taxpayer met his burden of proof as to where 
he was on each day of the year at issue (or on the days in dispute). 
Since a statutory resident spends more than 183 days of the taxable 
year in New York State,250 taxpayers endeavor to establish, often without 
success, that they were not in the state for the requisite time.251 The 
                                                                                                         
246 N.Y. Commissioner of Taxation and Finance Advisory Opinion TSB–A–91 (10) 1, 
Petition No. 1910904B, 1991 WL 323200 (N.Y. Dept. Tax. Fin. Dec. 24, 1991).  
247 Id. Prior to entering the New York nursing home, the taxpayer lived in New Jersey in 
a home she owned jointly with her sister.  
248 The imposition of New York income tax on statutory residents was upheld against a 
challenge that imposition of the tax violated the U.S. Const., art. I, § 8 (the dormant 
Commerce Clause). Tamagni v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of N.Y., 695 N.E.2d 1125 (N.Y. 
1998). Mr. and Mrs. Tamagni were domiciled in New Jersey. However, Mr. Tamagni 
worked in New York and maintained an apartment there. He was unable to establish that 
he was not in New York for over 183 days during the year. The statute has also withstood 
assertions that it resulted in a deprivation of property in violation of the Due Process Clause 
of the U.S. Const., 14th Amend. See also In re Klingenstein, 1998 WL 477697 (N.Y. Div. 
Tax App. Aug. 6, 1998).  
249 N.Y. Tax Law § 605(b)(1)(B) (McKinney 2015); tit. 20, § 105.20(d)(4).  
250 N.Y. Tax Law § 605(b)(1)(B) (McKinney 2015).  
251 In re Holt, No. 821018, 2008 WL 2880343 (N.Y. Tax App. Trib. July 17, 2008). Mr. 
Holt owned a residence in New York, but argued unsuccessfully that he was not a statutory 
resident as he was not present in New York for 183 days in any year. See also In re 
Kingenstein, No. 815156, 1998 WL 477697 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. Aug. 6, 1998).  
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taxpayer has the burden of proof on this point.252 Clear and convincing 
evidence is required.253 To meet this burden the taxpayer may be required 
to establish not only that she was not in New York for more than 183 days, 
but also where she was on days spent outside New York.254 Adequate 
records are required to substantiate the fact that a taxpayer was not in the 
state for more than 183 days.255 The taxpayers’ testimony that “they left 
for Florida in October or November and returned (to New York) in mid–
April or May” is not adequate evidence.256 A taxpayer’s testimony 
unsupported by documentation, such as “travel records or receipts, tickets, 
hotel receipts, credit card invoices” is unlikely to alone satisfy the 
taxpayer’s burden of proof.257 A court commenting on the evidence 
required stated 
It is true that credible testimony can be sufficient to meet 
a taxpayer’s burden to Establish that she was not present 
in New York for more than 183 days (Matter of Avildsen, 
Tax Appeals Tribunal, May 19, 1994). It is also true that 
a taxpayer is not required to specifically account for her 
whereabouts on every day of the period in question if she 
can establish a ‘pattern of conduct’ from which her 
location may be determined for any particular day (Matter 
of Kern, supra). However, the Tribunal has distinguished 
                                                                                                         
252 tit. 20, § 105.20(c); see In re Kornblum v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 599 N.Y.S.2d 158 
(3d Dept. 1993); In re Stewart, No. 816263, 2000 WL 49084, at *16 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. 
Jan. 13, 2000).  
253 Holt, 2008 WL 2880343.  
254 Stewart, 2000 WL 49084 at *16. The tax auditor relied on daily itineraries and hired 
car invoices to conclude that the taxpayer was in New York on certain days. Id. The 
taxpayer was able to establish that these records, although provided by her, were 
inaccurate. Id. The records did not adequately account for changes in her schedule, hired 
car services she arranged for other persons or to transport props and similar matters. Id. 
The Division of Tax Appeals agreed that the records could not establish that the taxpayer 
was in New York on given days. Id. That left many days for which the taxpayer failed to 
offer adequate proof of her location. Id. The taxpayer was not able to use these same 
unreliable records to prove where she was on given dates. Id. Dates on which proof of the 
taxpayer’s location was not established were “unknown” and counted as days in New York. 
Id.  
255 tit. 20, § 105.20(c); see Schibuk v. N.Y.S. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 733 N.Y.S.2d 801, 
803 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 2001) (reflecting that taxpayers’ failure to offer proof that they 
spent fewer than 183 days in New York during the years justified a ruling that they were 
statutory residents.).  
256 In re Lieberman, No. 824101, 2013 WL 3790595 *7 (N.Y. Div. Tax. App. July 11, 
2013).  
257 Stewart, 2000 WL 49084 at *16 (noting that “[n]o handwritten diary or day–to–day 
records were introduced.”).  
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these cases from those where testimony alone is offered 
as proof of whereabouts.258 
Contemporaneous records maintained by the taxpayer showing his 
location on a daily basis need to be produced for the taxpayer to prevail.259 
Examples of the records sought by the Tax Department and the court 
include detailed daily diaries, credit card statements, airline tickets, and 
restaurant and hotel receipts,260 bank statements and telephone records.261 
Other pertinent documents include employer expense reports, telephone 
and utility bills, and passport copies.262 Where applicable, the taxpayer 
might submit a copy of his employment agreement or other documents 
reflecting that his employer knew and approved of the taxpayer working 
from a location outside New York. Affidavits and testimony of persons 
who knew the taxpayer’s whereabouts, such as a limousine driver who 
regularly took the taxpayer to and from the airport, would be useful. 
Taxpayers may establish that, although their New York residence was 
used, or utility bills or credit card charges reflect use in New York, it was 
not the taxpayers who were present, or an online credit card charge 
actually originated in another state where the taxpayer was located at the 
time of purchase.263 
Taxpayers have unsuccessfully advanced various arguments about 
how days should be counted or what days should be included in 
                                                                                                         
258 Id. at *17. Where a pattern of conduct is shown, a taxpayer’s testimony may add facts 
explaining her location on given days unaccounted for. Id. In Stewart no pattern was 
established, and the taxpayer failed to demonstrate that she was not in New York for in 
excess of 183 days during the year. Id.  
259 In re Holt, No. 821018, 2008 WL 2880343 (N.Y. Tax App. Trib. July 17, 2008).  
260 Id.  
261 In re Knoebel, No. 824117, 2013 WL 5433720 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. Sept. 19, 2013). 
See Stewart, 2000 WL 49084 at *2, where the auditor suggested that a daily schedule of 
the taxpayer’s location be established by “personal or business diaries, credit card receipts, 
checking accounts maintained in New York and Connecticut [taxpayer’s domicile], travel 
records, business expense reports, frequent flyer records, telephone invoices from New 
York and Connecticut and limousine or driver records.” Id.  
262 Holt, 2008 WL 2880343; In re Lepley, No. 814368, 1997 WL 359017 at *13 (N.Y. 
Div. Tax App. June 19, 1997).  
263 Knoebel, 2013 WL 5433720. Mr. and Mrs. Knoebel lived in Pennsylvania but 
maintained an apartment in New York. Id. They were able to establish that various days 
during which their New York apartment was occupied, it was one of their adult daughters 
who was in residence. Id. Telephone calls were made from the apartment on days the 
taxpayers were in Pennsylvania. Id. The daughters also used the taxpayers’ credit cards in 
New York on days the taxpayers provided proof that they were elsewhere. Id. The 
taxpayers were ultimately not successful in avoiding status as statutory residents, due to 
their inability to prove their absence from New York for a sufficient number of days. Id.  
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determining when a taxpayer is within New York264 in an effort to avoid 
the bright line test enunciated in the regulations. The well–established rule 
set forth in the regulations265 that presence within New York State for any 
part of a calendar day counts as a day in New York was again recently 
upheld.266 A taxpayer domiciled outside New York but near the border 
claimed that days on which the taxpayer entered New York to dine at a 
restaurant or shop at a store for a few hours should not count as days the 
taxpayer was in New York.267 While the taxpayer worked in New York 
City and maintained a residence there, the dining and shopping trips were 
from the taxpayer’s home in Connecticut and bore no connection to his 
New York City apartment or his business.268 The taxpayer’s argument that 
a common sense “proximity test” should be used to determine the days on 
which a taxpayer was present in New York was rejected, and was viewed 
by the tribunal as likely to lead to further litigation about what was or was 
not proximate.269 Because the taxpayer’s dining and shopping trips were 
“not unintended, unavoidable, unplanned, inadvertent or involuntary” but 
were both “purposeful and voluntary”, his limited physical presence in 
New York counted as days in New York for purposes of determining his 
status as a statutory resident.270 The reason for a taxpayer entering New 
York is not generally relevant to determining statutory residence.271 For a 
taxpayer to be a statutory resident, there is no requirement that his purpose 
in entering New York on any given day bear any relationship to the New 
York abode he maintains.272 
Another Connecticut resident argued before the administrative law 
judge that the taxpayer’s trips to New York for the sole purpose of food 
                                                                                                         
264 Leach v. Chu, 540 N.Y.S.2d 596 (App. Div. 1989) (upholding the definition of “day,” 
in the regulations, to include any part of a day rather than an entire 24–hour period.).
265 tit. 20, § 105.20(c).  
266 Zametti v. N.Y.S. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 8 N.Y.S.3d 733 (App. Div. 2015). The court 
reaffirmed the rule in effect for over twenty–five years, noting “where, as here, there is 
longstanding precedent involving statutory construction, such precedent is not lightly set 
aside since, if the Court’s interpretation was incorrect, the Legislature could have thereafter 
clarified its intent.” Id. at 735.  
267 In re Klingenstein, No. 815156, 1998 WL 477697 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. Aug. 6, 1998).  
268 Id. If the additional 21 or 22 days involving shopping or dining trips did not count as 
days in New York, the taxpayer was not present in New York for more than 183 days and 
thus would not have been liable for income tax as a statutory resident. Id.  
269 Id. The tribunal also expected litigation about the time within a 24–hour period a 
taxpayer had to be in New York for him to be present, if the proximity test proposed by the 
taxpayer was adopted. Id. The tribunal found “the need for consistency provided by an 
easily defined and applied rule” set forth in the regulation defining days outweighed any 
inequity resulting when that rule was applied to the facts of a given taxpayer’s case. Id.  
270 Id.  
271 Id.  
272 Id.  
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shopping should not be counted as days spent in New York for purposes 
of determining if he was a statutory resident.273 The judge considered the 
lack of a connection between the grocery trips and either the taxpayer’s 
New York employment or New York place of abode.274 The Tax Appeals 
Tribunal agreed with the taxpayer that, on the facts presented, including 
that the taxpayer and his spouse were “separated in fact”, the non–
domiciliary taxpayer did not maintain a permanent place of abode in New 
York. Therefore, the day count was irrelevant, and the Tax Appeals 
Tribunal declined to address the day count or the shopping excursions.275 
Despite the literal wording of the regulation that if a taxpayer is 
present in New York for any part of a day the day counts as one spent in 
New York, the courts recognize an additional exception not appearing in 
the statute or the regulation. “[W]hen a nondomiciliary [of New York 
State] seeks treatment in New York for a serious illness, the time spent in 
the medical facility for the treatment of that illness should not be counted 
in determining whether such a nondomiciliary was a resident of the State 
for income tax purposes during such confinement.”276 Similarly a taxpayer 
initially domiciled outside New York does not become a statutory resident 
when she enters a nursing home in New York on the advice of her 
physician, although the taxpayer is expected to remain in the nursing home 
permanently.277 According to the government there are two justifications 
for this conclusion. Occupancy in a nursing home does not constitute 
maintaining an abode, and days in a medical facility do not count as days 
in New York.278 It is only days in a medical facility or nursing home that 
are not counted. Days during which the taxpayer is in New York at his 
residence receiving care as an outpatient or recovering from an illness are 
included in the computation as days spent in New York. 
Where a taxpayer is domiciled in Florida but owns residential real 
property in New York occupied occasionally by the taxpayer, the 
                                                                                                         
273 In re Moed, No. 810997, 1993 WL 491193 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. 1993 Nov. 18, 1993).  
274 Id.  
275 Id.  
276 Stranahan v. N.Y.S. Tax Comm., 416 N.Y.S.2d 836, 839 (App. Div. 1979). Stranahan 
involved a taxpayer domiciled in Florida who leased an apartment in New York City. Id. 
She occupied the apartment infrequently during shopping trips, before leaving the country 
on vacations and while in New York to attend occasional social functions. Id. During the 
year in question (1973) the woman became ill and sought treatment at a New York hospital. 
Id. She was admitted to the hospital three times during the year spending a total of 148 
days hospitalized. Id. In between hospital stays, she occupied her New York apartment for 
67 days, as her doctors determined she was too ill to return to her home in Florida. Id. New 
York claimed she was a statutory resident, as she spent 215 days during the year in New 
York. Id. The court rejected that determination. Id.  
277 N.Y. Commissioner of Taxation and Finance Advisory Opinion TSB–A–91 (10) 1, 
Petition No. 1910904B, 1991 WL 323200 (N.Y. Dept. Tax. Fin. Dec. 24, 1991).  
278 Id.  
2018] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 49 

taxpayer’s relocation to a New York nursing home for permanent care will 
not alone cause her to be a statutory resident of New York.279 However, 
when a non–domiciliary travels to New York to care for an ill relative, 
those days in New York are counted in determining if the non–domiciliary 
is a statutory resident.280 
When taxpayers sold and vacated their New York home during the 
year, a question may remain about the date on which they ceased to be 
residents. Having maintained a home in New York for part of the year, a 
factual inquiry is necessary to ascertain when resident status ended. 
Relevant facts might include: 
(a) The date on which the taxpayer sold the New York home;281 
(b) The date on which taxpayer vacated the former New York 
residence and removed all belongings from the home;282 
(c) When the taxpayers enrolled their children in school in the new 
state of domicile;283 and 
(d) Agreements pertaining to residence.  
In one case while the taxpayers resided in New York they purchased 
a home in Vermont.284 The mortgage executed by the taxpayers included 
a representation that they would not occupy the Vermont home as their 
legal residence.285 This agreement precluded a change of domicile to 
Vermont until the mortgage was satisfied.286 
V. NONRESIDENT OUTSIDE THE U.S. 
Historically, a higher standard was imposed on a New York 
domiciliary who claimed to have changed her domicile to a location 
                                                                                                         
279 Commissioner of Taxation and Finance Advisory Opinion TSB–A–2006 (6)(1), 
Petition No. Z060130A, 2006 WL 2741862 (N.Y. Dept. Tax Fin. Aug. 28, 2006). The 
taxpayer was a married woman whose only connection to New York was owning real 
estate. Id. One apartment owned by the incompetent taxpayer and her spouse was 
occasionally occupied by her. Id. Two other New York apartments were owned by the 
taxpayer, her spouse and her daughter, a New York resident. Id.  
280 See In re Knoebel, No. 824117, 2013 WL 5433720, at 5* (N.Y. Div. Tax App. Sept. 
19, 2013).  
281 Schibuk v. N.Y.S. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 733 N.Y.S.2d 801 (App. Div. 2001) (the 
taxpayers’ claim that they ceased being New York residents in June was rejected, where 
they contracted to sell their New York home in October and the sale did not close until 
December). 
282 Id.  
283 Id. at 803. In Schibuk this was the deciding factor, as the new Vermont residence had 
previously served as the taxpayer’s vacation home.  
284 Id. at 802.  
285 Id.  
286 Id.  
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outside the U.S.287 “The presumption against a foreign domicile is stronger 
than the general presumption against a change of domicile.”288 The 
presumption may only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence.289 
Whether this higher standard still applies or should still apply has been 
questioned.290 
[A] United States citizen will not ordinarily be deemed to 
have changed such citizen’s domicile by going to a 
foreign country unless it is clearly shown that such citizen 
intends to remain there permanently. For example, a 
United States citizen domiciled in New York State who 
goes abroad because of an assignment by such citizen’s 
employer or for study, research or recreation, does not 
lose such citizen’s New York domicile unless it is clearly 
shown that such citizen intends to remain abroad 
permanently and not to return . . . .291  
To relinquish New York residence for income tax purposes when one 
moves outside the U.S., in addition to possessing the requisite intent the 
taxpayer must establish domicile in the country to which he moved.292 
                                                                                                         
287 Mercor v. State Tax Comm., 459 N.Y.S.2d 938 (App. Div. 1983) (citing Matter of 
Reeves v. State Tax Comm., 437 N.Y.S. 2d 969 (1981)); Bodfish v. Gallman, 378 N.Y.S.2d 
138 (App. Div. 1976). But see In re Patrick, No. 826838, 2017 WL 2801958 (N.Y. Div. 
Tax App. June 15, 2017) (where no higher standard was mentioned although the taxpayer 
moved from New York to Paris, France).  
288 Bodfish, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 140.  
289 Klein v. State Tax Comm., 390 N.Y.S.2d 686, 687 (App. Div. 1977) (In May of 1969 
the taxpayer husband accepted employment in Switzerland under a three-year employment 
contract. He and his wife moved to Switzerland, where they rented a residence, paid taxes, 
purchased an auto and joined civic organizations. The court did not find the evidence 
sufficiently compelling to support a determination that the taxpayers’ domicile changed 
from New York to Switzerland. The outcome unfavorable to the taxpayers was based in 
part on their inability to sublet their leased New York apartment, continued maintenance 
of bank accounts in New York, continued status as non–resident members of New York 
organizations, and a return visit to New York during which the husband executed a will 
including New York entities as beneficiaries). 
290 See Klein v. State Tax Comm., 402 N.Y.S.2d 396 (App. Div. 1977) (Fuchsberg, J. 
dissenting).  
291 tit. 20, § 105.20(d)(3).  
292 Bodfish, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 140 (Mr. Bodfish was employed by a corporation with 
worldwide offices. He resided with his family in New York, where he owned a home, until 
February 1970, when he was transferred by his employer to Pakistan. Mr. Bodfish lived in 
Pakistan until January of 1973, when his employer transferred him to London, England. 
During 1970, after his relocation to Pakistan, the taxpayer returned to New York three 
times. His family did not join him in Pakistan until July of 1970. The taxpayer entered 
Pakistan on a four–year visa rather than seeking permanent immigration status. These facts 
lead the court to conclude that the taxpayer remained domiciled in New York during 1970); 
see also Bernbach v. State Tax Comm., 471 N.Y.S.2d 903 (App. Div. 1984) (where a 
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Other factors considered to determine whether a taxpayer relinquished his 
New York domicile when he moves to a foreign country are whether the 
move is temporary or permanent, whether the taxpayer follows normal 
procedures to obtain permission to live and work in the new locale, secures 
employment in the new locale, the duration of the taxpayer’s prior 
residence in New York, what assets the taxpayer continued to own in New 
York, whether the relocation was employment related, and other ties to 
New York and the alleged new domicile after the move.293 Only factors 
initially relied on by the State Tax Commission for its initial determination 
may be considered by the court.294 If those factors are inadequate to 
support the Commission’s determination, other facts cannot be substituted 
which would justify the Commission’s conclusion.295 Actions 
demonstrating preparation to relocate to another country, without actually 
establishing domicile there, are not adequate to support a ruling favoring 
the taxpayer.296 
Where a U.S. citizen is a New York domiciliary and continues to 
maintain a residence in New York, she may remain domiciled in New 
York when she accepts employment in another country.297 This was the 
finding where a U.S. citizen maintained her former New York City home 
                                                                                                         
taxpayer established a domicile in France by moving there with his minor children, 
marrying a French national, residing in an apartment there for which his wife signed a 
nine–year lease, consulting counsel about remaining permanently in France, obtaining 
legal permission to do so, and obtaining employment in France).  
293 Bernbach, 471 N.Y.S. 2d at 904–05 (The taxpayer’s retention of a New York bank 
account with a nominal sum on deposit was not determinative, particularly as he instructed 
his attorney to close the account. His continued ownership of a New York cooperative, 
occupied by his first wife after their divorce until it was sold also did not alter the 
conclusion that the taxpayer’s domicile changed. The court reached its determination, in 
part based on the taxpayer obtaining a French driver’s license and maintaining an auto 
registered in France. The court declined to consider certain facts noted by the Commission 
on appeal, because the Commission did not rely on the facts as a basis for its initial 
determination).  
294 Id. at 905.  
295 Id.  
296 Kennedy v. N.Y.S. Income Tax Bureau, 446 N.Y.S.2d 429, 430 (App. Div. 1981) 
(Mr. Kennedy was a New York resident for 18 years before he commenced efforts to 
relocate to Canada. He left his wife and children in New York while he moved to Canada 
to work there. Mr. Kennedy lived in a leased residence in Canada, investigated medical 
care for his ill spouse, worked with a realtor in Canada to locate a home to purchase, and 
planned to sell his New York residence once he did so. “He also opened an account with a 
Canadian bank, registered his automobile with the Province of Ontario, filed and paid taxes 
to the Canadian government and inquired of the Canadian Consulate as to the procedures 
for becoming a landed immigrant.” Within 8 months after his move, Mr. Kennedy’s 
employment ended due to his Canadian employer’s financial reverses. These facts 
supported the conclusion that Mr. Kennedy was merely preparing to change his domicile 
but had not done so).  
297 In re Taylor, No. 822824, 2010 WL 2801873 (N.Y. Div. Tax. App. July 8, 2010).  
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and a vacation property in New York State, while she accepted 
employment and lived for years in London.298 In reaching this conclusion 
emphasis was placed on the facts that the taxpayer’s employment contracts 
in each position were of limited one year to three year duration, her 
employment contract referenced New York as her home location, she was 
entitled to a housing allowance reflecting the employer’s belief that she 
would continue to maintain her New York home, and her employment 
contract required the employer to pay for her to return herself and her 
belongings to her former home.299 The tribunal concluded that the 
taxpayer’s determination of where she would reside at any time was based 
on her employment opportunities, negating any claim that she had, during 
the tax years in dispute, developed a fixed intent to remain in London 
permanently.300 This determination was reached although the taxpayer, 
who was unable to obtain U.K. citizenship during the tax years in dispute, 
applied for and obtained U.K. citizenship at the earliest opportunity.301 The 
taxpayer’s failure to establish that she adopted a new domicile resulted in 
her continued status as a domiciliary of New York.302 
In contrast, the fact that a taxpayer who moved from New York to 
France immediately applied for and obtained permission from the French 
government to remain as a resident for the longest term allowable was 
viewed as supporting a change in domicile.303 Similarly, where a long time 
resident of New York accepts a job relocation by his New York corporate 
employer to Australia, he may successfully establish that his domicile 
changed.304 The taxpayer was needed in Australia by his employer to 
attend to existing clients and expand the business. He married an 
Australian native, leased an expensive home in Australia which he 
eventually purchased, and repeatedly obtained the longest duration visas 
available, although he did not apply for Australian citizenship. While the 
taxpayer retained his New York rent controlled apartment and 
occasionally stayed there, after his move to Australia the apartment was 
                                                                                                         
298 Id.  
299 Id. The issue in the case was domicile, as the taxpayer was not present in New York 
for more than 183 days, but was present for more than 30 days.  
300 Id.  
301 Id. Many facts were present which could have supported a ruling in the taxpayer’s 
favor. She purchased and improved an expensive home in London, was active in charitable 
and civic organizations in London, and employed professionals there. However, the 
taxpayer’s behavior was viewed as inconsistent. She maintained both New York and 
United Kingdom driver’s licenses, voted in elections in both places, did not rent either of 
her New York homes, filed tax returns in the U.S. and the U.K., and claimed to have a Will 
requiring her remains to be left in London on her death.  
302 Id.  
303 In re Patrick, No. 826838, 2017 WL 2801958 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. June 15, 2017).  
304 In re Lepley, 1997 WL 359017 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. June 19, 1997).  
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principally used by his employer’s clients. The taxpayer had not invested 
in New York real estate, but made substantial investments in commercial 
property in Australia. He joined social clubs in Australia. The taxpayer 
eventually returned to New York for business reasons when his marriage 
ended, at which time he purchased a home in New York. These facts were 
adequate to demonstrate taxpayer’s intent to change his domicile to 
Australia at the time of his move.305 
Although a taxpayer sells his home in New York and departs from the 
U.S., if his move is not viewed as permanent he may remain domiciled in 
New York for income tax purposes.306 A taxpayer who accepted a job in 
England, sold his New York home and moved his family to England was 
still domiciled in New York as a debilitating medical ailment caused him 
to return to New York two years later.307 The court’s ruling was based on 
the taxpayer’s failure to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that he 
intended to remain in England permanently.308 
The Tax Commission has taken the position, albeit unsuccessfully at 
times, that a taxpayer who sells his New York home, severs ties to New 
York and moves to Canada for a new job, does not change his domicile if 
there is any possibility that his stay in Canada is not indefinite and that he 
might conceivably return to New York.309 In one case the taxpayers 
obtained permanent resident visas in Canada, and had the legal right to 
                                                                                                         
305 Id. at *22 (Facts relied on by the Tax Division to support a contrary determination 
included taxpayer’s initial agreement to accept employment in Australia for at least two 
years, his retention of a New York driver’s license, his retention of his New York rental 
apartment, his failure to move furniture from the New York apartment to Australia, his 
business trips to New York, his receipt of bills pertaining to the New York apartment at 
that location, his occasional visit to a New York physician although his primary medical 
care was provided in Australia, and his occasional attendance at a cultural event in New 
York. These facts combined were not sufficiently persuasive to justify the conclusion that 
the taxpayer lacked the requisite intent to change his domicile).  
306 Mercer v. State Tax. Comm., 459 N.Y.S.2d 938 (App. Div. 1983).  
307 Id.  
308 Id. at 939 (the court’s decision was based on the taxpayer’s testimony that he only 
intended to remain in England until he retired; thereafter, he planned to move to Florida 
where other family members lived; he only obtained an annually issued working visa and 
did not apply for U.K. citizenship, and he readily accepted job transfers under one year 
employment contracts).  
309 McKone v. State Tax Comm., 490 N.Y.S. 2d 628, 629 (App. Div. 1985) (Mr. and 
Mrs. McKone moved from Canada to New York when Mr. McKone accepted employment 
there. Six years later Mr. McKone accepted a change in location of employment in 
connection with a promotion to a Canadian office of his employer. The family sold their 
New York home, closed their New York bank accounts, and moved themselves and their 
possessions to Canada, severing all ties to New York. Neither taxpayer was from New 
York or had family or friends there. After the move to Canada the taxpayers belonged only 
to Canadian organizations. Mrs. McKone was from Canada and her family lived there. The 
taxpayers did not vote in New York after the move).  
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reside there.310 The court noted that the taxpayers were not required to 
prove that they intended to remain in a new location for the rest of their 
natural lives to change domicile.311 Instead, as the facts did not reflect that 
the taxpayers’ relocation was temporary, the fact that it might be of 
indefinite duration supported a finding that domicile changed.312 There 
was inconsistency in the Tax Commissioner’s position, in that when the 
taxpayer relocated to New York for a job of indefinite duration the 
Commissioner agreed that he became a New York domiciliary, but when 
identical facts reflected a move to Canada the Commissioner claimed no 
change occurred.313 
The reason or motivation causing a taxpayer to move to a foreign 
country is not determinative of whether he remains a New York 
resident.314 Nor is a taxpayer who departs from New York required to 
forfeit U.S. citizenship to establish that his domicile changed.315 
VI. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND IMPOSITION OF PENALTIES 
When a taxpayer contests a decision of the State Tax Commission in 
New York, the decision is affirmed by the court unless “the Tax 
Commission acted irrationally or upon less than substantial evidence in 
                                                                                                         
310 Id. at 629.  
311 Id.  
312 Id.  
313 Id.; see also Bernbach v. State Tax Comm., 471 N.Y.S. 2d 903 (App. Div. 1984) (in 
that case questions included both whether the taxpayer became a New York resident and 
whether he relinquished that status. While the Commissioner claimed the taxpayer became 
a New York resident and remained one the court disagreed. The same factors applied to 
resolve each question, and the taxpayer was no longer a New York resident once he moved 
to France. The needed rational basis for the Commissioner’s determination was lacking).  
314 Bernbach, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 904 (the fact that taxpayers moved to New York to 
facilitate the wife’s psychiatric treatment did not prevent them from becoming New York 
residents, or cause the move to be treated as temporary. Nor did the fact that the taxpayer 
husband may have been motivated to move to France to avoid losing custody of his minor 
children cause him to remain a New York resident).  
315 Id at 904. In Bernbach the taxpayer initially lived in a rental apartment in New Jersey 
with his wife and children. The family moved to New York in 1971, and occupied a 
cooperative apartment Mr. Bernbach purchased. During the following year the husband 
moved to France with his children, filed for divorce, and planned to marry a French 
national. The taxpayer retained ownership of the New York cooperative until his divorce 
was final and his former spouse vacated it. The taxpayer consulted with a French lawyer 
and took action to be allowed to reside and work in France, and sought employment in 
France. He married his French girlfriend, lived in France, opened a bank account there, 
obtained a French driver’s license and registered a car in France. While years later the 
taxpayer moved to England for employment purposes, this did not alter the court’s 
conclusion that he changed his domicile upon relocating to France and was not thereafter 
a New York resident for income purposes.  
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determining that petitioner [the taxpayer] had failed in meeting his burden 
of proving a change in domicile during the tax years in question.”316 The 
same burden applies to a nonresident of New York State who claims he is 
not a statutory resident.317 The Tax Commission’s determination is 
sustained if supported by substantial proof, even if the court might have 
reached a different decision had it considered the case de novo.318 When a 
taxpayer is contesting an assessment of income tax, he must prove the 
assessment was erroneous by clear and convincing evidence to prevail.319 
Administrative proceedings of the Division of Tax Appeals are not trials 
in court and different rules apply. For example, the best evidence rule does 
not apply in administrative proceedings.320 
Taxpayers who falsely answer no to the question on the state income 
tax return about whether they or their spouse maintained a residence in 
New York are at an increased risk for imposition of penalties.321 At a 
minimum, the taxpayer is not likely to be viewed as credible if he falsely 
reports that no New York residence was maintained.322 The fact that an 
accountant prepared the taxpayer’s tax return is not alone grounds for 
avoiding negligence penalties.323 As stated by the Division of Tax 
Appeals, it is a well–settled principle that each taxpayer has a non–
                                                                                                         
316 Clute v. Chu, 484 N.Y.S.2d 239, 242 (App. Div. 1984).  
317 El–Tersli v. Comm’r of Taxation and Fin., 787 N.Y.S.2d 526, 528 (App. Div. 2005) 
(the taxpayer must prove both “that he or she neither maintained a permanent place of 
abode in this state nor spent more than 183 days in the state during the tax year in dispute”). 
Id.  
318 Buzzard v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of N.Y., 613 N.Y.S.2d 294, 295 (App. Div.1994); 
Clute, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 241. See Gray v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of N.Y., 651 N.Y.S.2d 740, 
741 (App. Div. 1997); see also Kornblum v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of N.Y., 599 N.Y.S.2d 
158, 160 (App. Div. 1993) (where the court explained “[B]ecause we are not at liberty to 
substitute our judgment for a reasonable determination by the agency which is supported 
by substantial evidence simply because it is possible reasonably to reach a different 
conclusion based upon the evidence presented, even if it could be said that, after taking 
into account the decreased weight traditionally accorded formal declarations, petitioners’ 
evidence reasonably supports a finding of changed domicile, such, standing alone, is not a 
basis for our intervention”) (citations omitted).  
319 Attea v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 883 N.Y.S.2d 610, 612 (App. Div. 2009); El–Tersli v. 
Comm’r of Taxation and Fin., 787 N.Y.S.2d 526, 528 (App. Div. 2005); Bodfish v. 
Gallman, 378 N.Y.S. 2d 138 (App. Div. 1976).  
320 N.Y. Admin. Proc. Act § 306; 20 NYCRR § 3000.15(d) (2017); see In re Stewart, No. 
816263, 2000 WL 49084, *11 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. Jan. 13, 2000) (where the auditor’s 
worksheets and schedules of the taxpayer’s daily whereabouts were properly admitted into 
evidence, despite the taxpayer’s assertion that the best evidence rule precluded admission 
of these documents).  
321 See, e.g., In re Knight, No. 819485, 2006 WL 3350785 (N.Y. Tax App. Trib. 
November 9, 2006); see also In re Campaniello, No. 825354, 2015 WL 4071393, at *20 
(N.Y. Div. Tax. App. June 25, 2015).  
322 Campaniello, 2015 WL 4071393 at *20.
323 In re Mays, No. 826546, 2016 WL 6071985 at *5 (App. Div. Oct. 6, 2016).  
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delegable “duty to prepare and file timely tax returns with payment and 
the mere assertion, without more, of reliance upon professional advisors 
or employees does not constitute reasonable cause . . . .”324 
                                                                                                         
324 Id. (citing Matter of McGaughey, No. 814265, 1998 WL 155582 (N.Y.Tax App.Trib. 
March 19, 1998), confirmed, 268 App. Div. 2d 802 (2000)).  
